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One	  of	   the	  most	  perplexing	  problems	   in	  private	   law	   is	  when	  and	  how	  to	  
compensate	  victims	  for	  emotional	  harm.	  This	  article	  proposes	  a	  novel	  way	  
to	  accomplish	   this	   remedial	  goal—a	   restoration	  measure	  of	  damages.	   It	  
solves	   the	   two	   fundamental	   problems	   of	   compensation	   for	   emotional	  
harm—measurement	   and	   verification.	   Instead	   of	   measuring	   the	  
emotional	  harm	  and	  awarding	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  money	  damages,	  the	  
article	  proposes	   that	  damages	  be	  paid	   to	  directly	   restore	   the	  underlying	  
interest,	  the	  impairment	  of	  which	  led	  to	  the	  emotional	  harm.	  And	  to	  solve	  
the	  problem	  of	  verification—compensating	  only	  those	  who	  truly	  suffered	  
the	   emotional	   harm—the	   article	   develops	   a	   sorting	   mechanism	   that	  
separates	   sincere	   claimants	   from	   fakers,	   awarding	   the	   restoration	  
measure	  of	  damages	  only	  to	  account	  for	  the	  harm	  suffered	  by	  the	  former	  
class.	   The	   article	   demonstrates	   how	   the	   proposed	   restoration	   remedy	  
would	  apply	  in	  important	  cases,	  and	  discusses	  its	  relevance	  to	  additional	  
remedial	  challenges	  in	  private	  law.	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Private	   law	   does	   not	   eye	   claims	   of	   emotional	   harm	   generously.	   It	   is	   deeply	  
puzzling	   why.	   We	   live	   in	   a	   society	   where	   emotional	   interests	   like	   dignity,	   privacy,	  
personal	   fulfillment,	   and	   reputation	   are	   central	   to	   individual	  wellbeing,	  where	   people	  
are	  willing	  to	  pay	  nicely	  for	  emotional	  benefits,	  and	  where	  many	  institutions	  are	  focused	  
on	  advancing	  and	  protecting	  people’s	  emotional	  concerns.	  Public	  law	  and	  private	  norms	  
show	  increasing	  respect	  for	  emotional	  interests,	  and	  yet	  private	  law	  is	  lagging	  behind.	  	  
A	   primary	   reason	   for	   this	   misalignment	   is	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   conceptually	  
coherent	  private	  law	  remedy	  for	  emotional	  harm.	  For	  long,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  perplexing	  
problems	   in	  private	   law	  has	  been	  how	  to	  hold	  wrongdoers	  accountable	   for	  emotional	  
harms	   their	   actions	   cause.	   Unlike	   pecuniary	   or	   physical	   harms,	   emotional	   distress	   is	  
difficult	  to	  verify	  and	  quantify,	  and	  the	  remedial	  tools	  of	  private	  law—money	  damages	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or	   injunctions—are	   often	   ill	   suited	   to	   redress	   it.	   Private	   law	   needs	   a	   new	   remedy	   to	  
redress	  emotional	  harms	  that	  other	  areas	  of	  law	  regard	  as	  protection-­‐worthy.	  
This	  article	  offers	  a	  novel	  remedy	  for	  emotional	  harm—the	  restoration	  measure	  
of	  damages	  (“restoration	  damages”).	  Under	  this	  remedy,	  the	  wrongdoer	  is	  not	  required	  
to	  compensate	  the	  emotionally	  aggrieved	  parties	  directly,	  nor	  is	  the	  wrongdoer	  required	  
to	   undo	   the	   emotional	   harm.	   Instead,	   the	   wrongdoer	   has	   to	   restore	   the	   underlying	  
interest	  that	  was	  impaired—an	  impairment	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  emotional	  harm.	  	  
Consider	  the	  following	  example.	  Environmentally	  conscious	  buyers	  purchased	  at	  
a	  premium	  a	  vehicle	  that	  the	  seller	  falsely	  promoted	  as	  low	  emitting,	  and	  which	  in	  fact	  
was	   high-­‐emitting. 1 	  The	   aggrieved	   buyers	   recover	   the	   price	   overcharge,	   but	   seek	  
additional	  remedy	  for	  the	  emotional	  harm	  arising	  from	  having	  participated	  in	  polluting	  
activity.	   The	   court	  holds	   that	  buyers’	   primary	   interest	   in	   the	   transaction	   could	   indeed	  
have	  been	  environmental,	  and	  the	  violation	  of	  this	   interest	  entitles	  them	  to	  additional	  
compensation	  for	  emotional	  harm.	  But	  how	  should	  this	  harm	  be	  measured?	  Under	  the	  
restoration	  damages	  measure,	  the	  seller	  would	  not	  pay	  the	  buyers	  directly,	  but	  would	  
instead	   be	   ordered	   to	   pay	   for	   environmental	   improvements	   commensurate	   with	   the	  
environmental	   harm	   that	   the	   previously	   undisclosed	   emissions	   caused.	   The	   seller,	   for	  
example,	  could	  be	  ordered	  to	  purchase	  and	  set	  aside	  carbon	  allowances.	  Buyers	  would	  
thus	  experience	  a	  reprieve:	  the	  environmental	  objective	  that	  led	  them	  to	  purchase	  the	  
cars	  would	  be	  fully	  accomplished	  by	  the	  reduced	  emissions	  that	  the	  restoration	  remedy	  
forces.	  	  
Restoration	  damages	  address	  the	  two	  fundamental	  challenges	  of	  compensation	  
for	   emotional	   harm—measurement	   and	   verification—better	   than	   any	   other	   remedy.	  
Consider	   first	   the	  problem	  of	  measurement.	  Any	  money	  damage	  measure	  paid	   to	   the	  
plaintiff	   has	   to	   accomplish	   the	   impossible—quantify	   and	   monetize	   emotional	   harm.	  
Restoration	   damages	   are	   not	   paid	   directly	   to	   the	   aggrieved	   parties,	   and	   thus	   no	  
“exchange	  rate”	  is	  necessary	  to	  translate	  agony	  into	  dollars.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  In	  re	  Volkswagen	  "Clean	  Diesel"	  Mktg.,	  Sales	  Practices	  and	  Prods.	  Liab.	  Litig.,	  No.	  15-­‐md-­‐2672	  (N.D.	  
Cal.	  October	  25,	  2016)	  [hereinafter	  Volkswagen	  Settlement].	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The	   second	   problem	   restoration	   damages	   overcome	   is	   verification.	   Unlike	  
physical	  harms,	  claims	  of	  emotional	  harm	  are	  easy	  to	  fake	  and	  hard	  to	  verify.	  Because	  
restoration	   damages	   provide	   meaningful	   redress	   only	   to	   sincere	   plaintiffs	   who	   truly	  
suffered	  emotional	  distress,	   they	  are	  unattractive	   to	   fakers.	   In	  our	  example,	   requiring	  
the	  breaching	  seller	   to	  purchase	  carbon	  allowances	  provides	  a	  benefit	  only	  to	  “green”	  
car	  buyers.	  	  
Restoration	  damages	  would	  work	  perfectly	  if	  fakers	  refrain	  from	  seeking	  them.	  
They	  would	  repair	  the	  underlying	   injured	   interest	  only	  as	  much	  as	  necessary	  for	  those	  
who	   care	   about	   it	   and	   seek	   such	   redress.	   The	   concern,	   however,	   is	   that	   fakers	  would	  
seek	  restoration	  damages	  strategically,	  to	  bargain	  for	  high	  monetary	  settlements.	  While	  
such	  Coasian	  bargaining	  would	  safeguard	  against	  wasteful	   investment	  in	  restoration,	   it	  
would	   still	   be	   distortive	   because	   compensation	   will	   be	   excessive.	   To	   that	   end,	   the	  
second	  major	  contribution	  of	   this	  article	   is	   in	  developing	  a	  general	  sorting	  mechanism	  
that	  overcomes	  this	  concern.	  We	  show	  how	  to	  design	  an	  election	  of	  remedy	  regime	  that	  
would	   lead	   to	   restoration	   damages	   only	   for	   true	   victims,	   screening	   away	   fakers	   with	  
small	  cash	  awards.	  2	  
In	  its	  simplest	  form,	  the	  sorting	  mechanism	  requires	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  be	  offered	  
two	  choices:	  a	  restoration	  remedy	  paid	  directly	  to	  repair	  the	  underlying	   interest,	  none	  
of	  which	  goes	  to	  the	  plaintiff’s	  pocket;	  or	  a	  “small”	  bounty—a	  sum	  of	  money	  damages	  
paid	   directly	   to	   the	   plaintiff’s	   pocket.	   Sincere	   plaintiffs	   who	   truly	   care	   about	   the	  
underlying	   interest	  would	  choose	   the	   first	  option;	   fakers	  would	  choose	   the	  second.	   In	  
reality,	   the	  mechanism	  may	  have	   to	  be	  more	   complex,	   and	  award	  more	   than	  a	   trivial	  
bounty	  to	  some	  plaintiffs,	  to	  account	  for	  varying	  degrees	  of	  concern	  for	  the	  underlying	  
interest.	  We	  discuss	  ways	  to	  mitigate	  this	  complexity.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  A	  self-­‐selection	  mechanism	  to	  address	  a	  similar	  sorting	  problem	  has	  been	  developed	  independently	  in	  a	  
formal	  working	  paper	  by	  Nathan	  Atkinson,	  Using	  Choice	  of	  Remedies	  to	  Ensure	  Adequate	  Compensation	  –	  
Work	  in	  Progress	  (June	  2017).	  Atkinson’s	  sorting	  mechanism	  is	  related	  to	  a	  solution	  proposed	  in	  an	  earlier	  
article	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  strategic	  threats	  to	  use	  injunctions.	  See	  Ian	  Ayres	  &	  Kristin	  Madison,	  Threatening	  
Inefficient	  Performance	  of	  Injunctions	  and	  Contracts,	  148	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  45	  (1999).	  Unlike	  our	  mechanism	  
that	   addresses	   the	   award	   of	   emotional	   damages,	   Atkinson's	   mechanism	   focuses	   on	   a	   binary	   choice	  
offered	   to	   the	   plaintiff	   between	   injunction	   (or	   specific	   performance)	   and	   damages,	   when	   ex	   post	  
negotiation	  is	  not	  allowed.	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   Of	  course,	  this	  mechanism	  would	  only	  work	  to	  “separate”	  the	  sincere	  from	  the	  
faker	  types	  if	  plaintiffs	  who	  select	  the	  restoration	  remedy	  are	  barred	  from	  settling	  post-­‐
judgment	   and	   releasing	   the	   defendant	   from	   the	   adjudged	   restoration	   obligation.	  
Otherwise,	  all	  plaintiffs	  would	  choose	  the	  remedy	  that	   is	  costliest	   for	  the	  defendant—
restoration—and	  those	  who	  suffered	  no	  harm	  (or	   some	  small	  harm)	  would	  eventually	  
sell	   a	   release.	   The	   defendant	   would	   then	   have	   to	   pay	   damages	   exceeding	   the	   true	  
emotional	  harm	  inflicted.	  It	  is	  likewise	  important	  to	  bar	  side	  payments	  to	  the	  faker	  types	  
by	   third	   parties	  who	   do	   care	   about	   the	   underlying	   interest	   and	   hope	   to	   increase	   the	  
magnitude	  of	  restoration.	  Such	  claim	  selling	  would	  inflate	  the	  liability	  beyond	  the	  harm	  
suffered	  by	  legally	  recognized	  victims.	  
Restoration	   damages	   exploit	   a	   feature	   of	   a	   certain	   class	   of	   emotionally	  
distressing	   events—the	   impairment	   of	   some	   underlying	   concrete	   concern.	   The	   car	  
buyers	   in	   the	  emissions	  example	  were	  distressed	  because	   their	   interest	   (avoidance	  of	  
carbon	  emissions)	  was	   impaired.	   In	  other	   circumstances,	   the	  emotional	   distress	   could	  
arise	   from	   violation	   of	   religious,	   political,	   family,	   reputational,	   or	   spiritual	   values.	   For	  
example	  a	  seller	  may	  warrant	  that	  food	  it	  sells	  is	  vegetarian,	  or	  kosher,	  or	  fairly	  traded,	  
catering	   to	   the	   vegetarian,	   religious,	   or	   fairness	   values	   of	   its	   clientele.	   If	   the	   food	   is	  
discovered	   to	   lack	   the	   alleged	   properties,	   many	   (but	   not	   all)	   buyers	   will	   experience	  
foreseeable	   emotional	   harm.	   Again,	   rather	   than	   trying	   to	   make	   the	   aggrieved	   buyer	  
whole	  by	  money	  damages,	  the	  seller	  could	  be	  ordered	  to	  restore	  the	  underlying	  interest	  
by	   supporting	   animal	   welfare	   initiatives,	   or	   paying	   for	   the	   enhancement	   of	   religious	  
services,	   or	   contributing	   to	   fair	   trade	   causes.	   The	   values	   that	   prompted	   customers	   to	  
purchase	  the	  special	  food	  in	  the	  first	  place	  would	  be	  restored.3	  
Accordingly,	   many	   of	   the	   examples	   we	   have	   in	   mind	   for	   the	   application	   of	  
restoration	  damages	  address	  emotional	  distress	  arising	  from	  harm	  to	  a	  jointly	  consumed	  
good.	  The	  environment	  is	  a	  public	  good	  and	  its	  impairment	  aggrieves	  many	  consumers.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  restoration	  remedy	  shares	  some	  design	  features	  with	  the	  cy	  pres	  distribution	  sometimes	  awarded	  in	  
complex	   aggregate	   litigation.	   See	   Principles	   of	   the	   Law	  of	   Aggregate	   Litigation	   §	   3.07	   (2010).	  Under	   cy	  
pres,	  in	  settlements	  courts	  oblige	  defendants	  to	  pay	  to	  charities	  or	  promote	  societal	  interests,	  which	  are	  
closely	   related	   to	   the	  plaintiff's	   impaired	   interests.	   This	   is	  done	  when	  direct	   compensation	  of	   victims	   is	  
impractical.	  We	  discuss	  this	  comparison	  infra	  text	  accompanying	  note	  __.	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The	   same	   would	   be	   true	   for	   food	   and	   other	   products	   that	   are	   falsely	   marketed	   as	  
conforming	   to	   various	   criteria	  of	   social	   justice	   (e.g.,	   non-­‐GMO,	   locally	  made,	  humane,	  
and	  so	  on.	  Because	  the	  public	  concern	   implicated	  by	  a	  violation	  could	  be	  promoted	   in	  
various	  ways,	  the	  restoration	  measure	  of	  damages	   is	  designed	  to	  restore	  the	   impaired	  
interest	   through	  a	  substitute	  avenue.4	  When	  thus	  applied	   to	   the	  reclamation	  of	  public	  
goods,	  restoration	  damages	  create	  social	  benefits	  that	  likely	  exceed	  the	  social	  value	  of	  
private	  monetary	  damages.	  Whereas	  plaintiffs	  may	  spend	  money	  damages	  to	  purchase	  
private	  goods,	   restoration	  damages	   targeted	  to	   repair	  public	  goods	  create,	   in	  addition	  
benefits	  to	  third	  parties.	  Anyone	  valuing	  these	  attributes	  would	  benefit	  as	  well.	  	  
What	   about	   emotional	   harms	   arising	   from	   impairment	   of	   underlying	   private	  
interests	   that	   have	   no	   communal	   aspect?	   In	   theory,	   restoration	   damages	   could	   be	  
applied	   here	   too.	   Consider,	   two	   scenarios:	   (1)	   a	   consumer	   whose	   vacation	   trip	   was	  
ruined	  by	  the	  hotel’s	  breach	  of	  contract;5	  and	  (2)	  a	  homeowner	  who	  lost	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
private	  backyard	  due	  to	  destruction	  caused	  by	  land	  developer.6	  In	  both	  cases,	  standard	  
monetary	  remedies	  (restitution	  of	  the	  price	  in	  (1)	  and	  diminution	  of	  the	  home’s	  value	  in	  
(2))	  make	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  less	  than	  whole.	  The	  value	  of	  a	  vacation	  or	  of	  a	  tranquil	  
private	   backyard	   is	   in	   the	   emotional	   gratification	   they	   secure,	   not	   in	   the	  wealth	   they	  
produce.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  promisors	  can	  foresee	  a	  high	  likelihood	  of	  emotional	  harm	  
and	  would	  be	  under-­‐deterred	  if	  the	  law	  of	  remedies	  ignores	  this	  harm,	  as	  it	  often	  does.	  
We	   argue	   that	   in	   both	   cases	   restoration	   damages	   could	   be	   used	   as	   the	   appropriate	  
measure	   of	   expectation	   remedy.	   In	   (1),	   the	   hotel	   would	   remediate	   the	   emotional	  
distress	  by	  paying	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  substitute	  trip.	  And	  in	  (2)	  the	  contractor	  would	  pay	  
for	  the	  remediation	  of	  the	  backyard,	  however	  more	  costly	  it	  is	  relative	  to	  the	  diminution	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Notice	  that	  the	  restoration	  remedy	  is	  different	  from	  conventional	  in-­‐kind	  remedies,	  since	  it	  does	  not	  aim	  
to	  put	  the	  victim	  in	  precisely	   in	  the	  same	  position	  as	   in	  the	  violation-­‐free	  scenario.	  Conventional	   in-­‐kind	  
remedies	  are	  often	   impossible	   to	   implement.	   In	  our	  emissions	  example,	   the	  purchasers	  of	   the	  car	  have	  
already	   used	   it	   and	   polluted	   the	   air.	   The	   specific	  manifestation	   of	   the	   injury	   to	   the	   underlying	   interest	  
could	  not	  be	  reversed	  through	  the	  conventional	   in-­‐kind	  remedies.	   In	  contrast,	  the	  restoration	  remedy	  is	  
applicable	  because	  it	  is	  aimed	  at	  the	  underlying	  interest,	  not	  at	  its	  specific	  irreversible	  manifestation.	  
5See	   Miles	   Brignall,	   Holiday	   from	   hell?	   How	   to	   claim	   compensation,	   THE	   GUARDIAN	   (Sep.	   6,	   2014)	  
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/sep/06/holiday-­‐hell-­‐compensation-­‐claim-­‐summer-­‐break.	  
(RA:	  cite	  a	  case).	  
6	  RA:	  Cite	  a	  case.	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of	   market	   value.	   And,	   in	   both	   cases,	   the	   concern	   that	   fakers	   would	   make	   strategic	  
emotional	   harm	   claims	   can	   be	   resolved	   through	   the	   sorting	  mechanism.	   Thus,	   unlike	  
conventional	  approaches	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  defective	  service,	   the	  restoration	  measure	  
with	   its	   built-­‐in	   election	   of	   remedy	   mechanism	   awards	   the	   costlier	   remedy	   only	   to	  
deserving	  plaintiffs.	  	  
	   The	   article	   proceeds	   as	   follows.	   Part	   I	   provides	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   the	  
inadequate	   treatment	   of	   emotional	   harms	   in	   contract	   and	   tort	   law.	   Part	   II	   introduces	  
the	   restoration	   remedy	   as	   a	   novel	   way	   to	   redress	   emotional	   harm	   in	   general	   and	   in	  
cases	   of	   harm	   to	   public	   goods	   in	   particular.	   Part	   III	   discusses	   the	   social	   value	   of	  
restoration	  damages,	  arguing	  that	  it	  achieves	  the	  goals	  of	  compensation	  and	  deterrence	  
at	   low	   administrative	   costs,	  while	   also	   providing	   a	   remedy	   that	   is	   socially	   productive.	  
Part	   IV	   illustrates	   the	   application	   of	   the	   new	   remedy	   and	   its	   advantages	   in	   the	  
Volkswagen	  case.	   It	  also	  highlights	  difficulties	  of	   implementation	  and	  shows	  how	  they	  
could	  be	  overcome.	  	  
I.	  Emotional	  Harm	  in	  Private	  Law	  
	  
Private	  law	  does	  not	  eye	  claims	  of	  emotional	  harm	  generously.	  Perhaps	  because	  
they	   have	   thus	   far	   failed	   to	   identify	   a	   robust	   and	   theoretically	   satisfying	   damage	  
measure	   for	  emotional	  harms,	   courts	  are	   reluctant	   to	  award	  damages	   for	   stand-­‐alone	  
emotional	   harm.7	  Measurement	   and	   verification	   difficulties,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   concern	   of	  
frivolous	   claims,	   are	   the	  most	   common	   reasons.	   In	   this	   Section,	  we	  briefly	   summarize	  
the	  emotional	  damages	  doctrine	   that,	   in	   the	   following	  section,	  we	  propose	   to	   reform.	  
Readers	   familiar	   with	   this	   body	   of	   doctrine	   are	   urged	   to	   skip	   this	   discussion	   and	   go	  
directly	  to	  Part	  II.	  
A. Contract	  Law	  
1.	  Damages	  for	  Emotional	  Harm	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 RESTATEMENT	  (SECOND)	  OF	  CONTRACTS	  §	  353	  (1981)	  (“Recovery	  for	  emotional	  disturbance	  will	  be	  excluded	  
unless	   the	  breach	   also	   caused	  bodily	   harm	  or	   the	   contract	   or	   the	  breach	   is	   of	   such	   a	   kind	   that	   serious	  
emotional	  disturbance	  was	  a	  particularly	  likely	  result”). 
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In	  common	  law,	  a	  breach	  of	  contract	  does	  not	  generally	  give	  rise	  to	  damages	  for	  
the	  emotional	  harm	  that	  were	  caused	  by	   it.8	  This	   rule	   is	  puzzling.	  The	  goal	  of	  contract	  
remedies	   is	  to	  put	  the	  aggrieved	  party	   in	  as	  good	  a	  position	  as	   if	   the	  contract	  had	  not	  
been	  breached.	  Courts	  generally	  do	  recognize	  that,	  as	  an	  empirical	  matter,	  a	  breach	  of	  
contract	  is	  an	  emotionally	  disturbing	  event.	  They	  are	  not	  shy	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  aggrieved	  
party	  “might	  not	  be	  made	  whole	  absent	  an	  award	  of	  mental	  distress	  damages.”9	  And,	  
yet,	  the	  basic	  approach	  is	  to	  not	  award	  emotional	  damages.	  	  
Why?	  One	  bad	  explanation	  is	  foreseeability—the	  claim	  that	  the	  breaching	  party	  
did	   not	   know	   (or	   have	   reason	   to	   know)	   that	   breach	   would	   also	   cause	   consequential	  
emotional	   harm.10	  It’s	   a	   bad	   justification	   because	   courts,	   in	   the	   same	   breath,	   also	  
recognize	   “all	   breaches	   of	   contract	   do	   more	   or	   less”	   cause	   “distress,	   vexation	   and	  
annoyance.”11	  
A	   second	   and	   better	   justification	   for	   the	   no-­‐emotional-­‐damages	   rule	   is	   their	  
speculative	  nature.12	  Contract	   law	  does	  not	   allow	   compensation	   for	   uncertain	  harm,13	  
and	  emotional	  damages	  are	  uncertain	  and	  hard	  to	  verify	  and	  quantify.	  Yet	  it’s	  not	  clear	  
why	  emotional	  damages	  should	  be	  barred	  entirely.	  If	  their	  magnitude	  varies	  greatly	  and	  
cannot	   be	   proven	   with	   accuracy,	   why	   not	   award	   some	   intermediate	   of	   “average”	  
measure	  of	  damages?	  Or,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  some	  low-­‐end	  measure	  that	  is	  unlikely	  to	  err	  
on	  the	  side	  of	  over-­‐compensation?	  
A	  third,	  and	  sometimes	  a	  very	  good	  justification	  for	  the	  no-­‐emotional-­‐damages	  
rule	   is	   their	   avoidability. 14 	  Compensated	   for	   the	   pecuniary	   loss	   from	   breach,	   the	  
aggrieved	  party	   is	   able	   to	  purchase	  performance	  elsewhere,	   and	   the	  distress	   suffered	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  See	  e.g.,	  Erlich	  v.	  Menezes	  21	  Cal.4th	  543	   (Cal.	  1999)	   (emotional	  damages	  not	  available	   in	  a	  defective	  
construction	   case);	   Jankowski	   v.	   Mazzotta,	   7	   Mich.App.	   483,	   152	   N.W.2d	   49	   (1967)	   (same).	   Cite	  
Farnsworth.	  	  
9	  Valentine	  v.	  General	  American	  Credit,	  362	  N.W.2d	  628,	  ***	  (1984).	  
10	  Cite	  
11	  Steward	  v.	  Rudenr,	  84	  N.W.2d	  816,	  ***	  (Mich.	  1957);	  Kewin	  v.	  Mass.	  Mut.	  Life	  Ins.	  Co.,	  295	  N.W.2d	  50,	  
***	  (Mich.	  1980).	  
12	  RESTATEMENT	  (SECOND)	  OF	  CONTRACTS	  §	  353	  (“damages	  for	  emotional	  disturbance	  .	  .	  .	  are	  often	  particularly	  
difficult	  to	  establish	  and	  to	  measure”).	  
13	  RESTATEMENT	   (SECOND)	   OF	   CONTRACTS	   §	   352	   (1981)	   (“Damages	   are	   not	   recoverable	   for	   loss	   beyond	   an	  
amount	  that	  the	  evidence	  permits	  to	  be	  established	  with	  reasonable	  certainty”).	  	  
14	  RESTATEMENT	   (SECOND)	   OF	   CONTRACTS	   §	   350	   (1981)	   (“…damages	   are	   not	   recoverable	   for	   loss	   that	   the	  
injured	  party	  could	  have	  avoided	  without	  undue	  risk,	  burden	  or	  humiliation”).	  
9	  
	  
due	   to	   non-­‐performance	   ought	   to	   be	   cured,	   rendering	   any	   additional	   emotional	  
damages	   double	   compensation.	   Thus,	   for	   example,	   rather	   than	   bemoan	   the	   mental	  
anguish	  from	  a	  breached	  employment	  contract,	  the	  discharged	  employee	  is	  encouraged	  
to	  pursue	  mitigation	  strategies	  by	  seeking	  substitute	  occupation.	  	  
This	  avoidability	   justification	  for	  the	  no-­‐emotional-­‐damages	  rule	  might	  appear,	  
at	   first	   blush,	   to	   square	   well	   with	   the	   mimic-­‐the-­‐parties’-­‐will	   basis	   for	   remedies—
namely,	  the	  view	  that	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  would	  prefer,	  ex	  ante,	  to	  forgo	  such	  damages	  
and	  save	  the	  premium	  she	  would	  otherwise	  have	  to	  pay,	  through	  a	  price	  adjustment,	  for	  
this	  expanded	  breach	  insurance.15	  In	  theory,	  there	  is	  perhaps	  a	  reason	  why	  contracting	  
parties	  want	  coverage	  for	  pecuniary	  but	  not	  emotional	  losses,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  bit	  subtle.	  The	  
idea	   is	  that	  emotional	  harm	  does	  not	   increase	  the	  aggrieved	  party's	  marginal	  utility	  of	  
money	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  pecuniary	  harm	  does,	  so	  it	  would	  be	  irrational	  to	  transfer	  
money	   from	   the	   pre-­‐breach	   state	   to	   the	   post-­‐breach	   state,	   especially	   if	   such	   transfer	  
involves	   some	   transaction	   costs	   (such	  as	  measurement	   and	   litigation	   costs).16	  Perhaps	  
this	  is	  also	  why	  people	  who	  buy	  accident	  insurance	  policies	  do	  not	  seek	  added	  coverage	  
for	  emotional	  harms.17	  	  
But	  the	   insurance	  argument	  has	  a	  critical	   flaw:	   it	   ignores	  deterrence.	   If	  parties	  
suffer	   emotional	   harm	   that	   goes	   uncompensated,	   the	   breaching	   party	   does	   not	  
internalize	  the	  entire	  negative	  impact	  of	  breach	  and	  would	  take	  insufficient	  precautions	  
to	  guarantee	  performance.	  Ultimately,	   the	  parties’	   rational	  ex	  ante	   interest	   is	   to	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Samuel	  A.	  Rea,	  Jr.,	  Nonpecuniary	  Loss	  and	  Breach	  of	  Contract,	  11	  J.	  LEGAL	  STUD.	  35,	  53	  (1982).	  
16Richard	  J.	  Zeckhauser,	  Coverage	  for	  Catastrophic	  Illness,	  21	  PUB.	  POLICY	  149	  (1973)	  (***);	  Philip	  J.	  Cook	  &	  
Daniel	  A.	  Graham,	  The	  Demand	  for	  Insurance	  and	  Protection:	  The	  Case	  of	  Irreplaceable	  Commodities,	  91	  
Q.	   J.	   ECON.	   143	   (1977)	   (***);	  Micheal	   Spence,	   Consumer	  Misperceptions,	   Product	   Failure	   and	   Producer	  
Liability,	  44	  REV.	  ECON.	  STUD.	  138	  (1977)	  (***);	  Steven	  Shavell,	  Theoretical	  Issues	  in	  Medical	  Malpractice,	  in	  
THE	  ECONOMICS	  OF	  MEDICAL	  MALPRACTICE	  35	  (Simon	  Rottenberg	  ed.,	  1978)	  (***).For	  an	  attempt	  at	  a	  counter-­‐
argument,	  that	  victims	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  insure	  against	  non-­‐pecuniary	  losses,	  see	  Steven	  P.	  Croley	  &	  Jon	  
D.	  Hanson,	  The	  Nonpecuniary	  Costs	  of	  Accidents:	  Pain-­‐and-­‐Suffering	  Damages	   in	  Tort	   Law,	  108	  HARV.	   L.	  
REV.	  1785,	  1896-­‐1914	  (1995).	  
17	  Rea,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  39.	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their	  contract	  governed	  by	  remedial	  rules	  that	   induce	  optimal	  performance	  incentives.	  
Excluding	  emotional	  damages	  categorically	  undermines	  this	  interest.18	  
Despite	   the	   general	   reluctance	   to	   award	   emotional	   damages,	   courts	   have	  
carved	  out	  narrow	  exceptions.	  These	  exceptions	  identify	  scenarios	  in	  which	  unavoidable	  
emotional	  harm	  is	  particularly	  likely	  to	  result	  from	  breach.19	  The	  most	  prominent	  test	  is	  
when	   the	  emotional	  harm	  accompanies	   some	  physical	   injury,	   and	  we’ll	   discuss	   this	   in	  
the	   next	   section	   dealing	   with	   tort	   remedies.	   In	   addition,	   courts	   recognize	   a	   “narrow	  
exception”	   when	   the	   contract	   “has	   elements	   of	   personality”—namely,	   “a	   contract	  
meant	   to	   secure	   protection	   of	   personal	   interests.”20	  Contracts	   are	   found	   to	   have	   a	  
“personal	   element”—as	   contrasted	   with	   the	   more	   common	   “commercial	   element”—
when	   their	   primary	   purpose	   is	   not	   economic	   or	   patrimonial	   but	   to	   advance	   psychic	  
satisfaction,	  to	  secure	  relief	  from	  a	  particular	  emotional	  inconvenience	  or	  annoyance,	  or	  
to	  confer	  a	  particular	  emotional	  enjoyment.21	  While	   the	   list	  of	  contracts	   recognized	  to	  
have	   such	   features	   is	   a	   relic	   of	   an	   older	   era22—it	   is,	   for	   example,	   surprising	   that	  
employment	   contracts	   are	   not	   generally	   recognized	   to	   have	   an	   “element	   of	  
personality”23—the	  doctrine	  is	  founded	  on	  a	  solid	  principle:	  award	  emotional	  damages	  
when	   the	  parties	   entered	   the	   contract	   in	  pursuit	   of	   the	   very	   same	  emotional	   interest	  
that	  was	  eventually	  harmed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Rea,	   id,	   at	   37	   (“…there	   is	   a	   conflict	   between	   the	   insurance	   and	   incentive	   objectives.	   The	   theory	   of	  
optimal	  insurance	  suggests	  that	  nonpecuniary	  losses	  should	  not	  necessarily	  be	  compensated,	  but	  lack	  of	  
such	  compensation	  may	  affect	  the	  seller's	  incentive	  to	  honor	  the	  contract”).	  	  
19	  RESTATEMENT	   (SECOND)	   OF	   CONTRACTS	   §	   353	   ("breach	   is	   of	   such	   kind	   that	   serious	   emotional	   disturbance	  
was	  a	  particularly	  likely	  result.").	  
20	  Kewin,	  295	  N.W.2d	  50,	  ***	  (emotional	  damages	  available	  when	  the	  contracts	  breached	  are	  "concerned	  
not	  with	   trade	  and	  commerce	  but	  with	  life	  and	  death,	  not	  with	  profit	  but	  with	  elements	  of	  personality,	  
not	  with	  pecuniary	  aggrandizement	  but	  with	  matters	  of	  mental	  concern	  and	  solicitude,”);	  Valentine,	  362	  
N.W.2d	   628,	   ***	   (“Rather	   than	   look	   to	   the	   foreseeability	   of	   loss	   to	   determine	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	  
exception,	  the	  court	  considers	  whether	  the	  contract	  has	  elements	  of	  personality	  and	  whether	  the	  damage	  
suffered	   upon	   the	   breach	   of	   the	   agreement	   is	   capable	   of	   adequate	   compensation	   by	   reference	   to	   the	  
terms	  of	  the	  contract”).	  
21	  Valentine,	  362	  N.W.2d	  628,	  ***	  .	  
22	  Typical	  examples	  are	  tour	  package	  contracts,	  contracts	  to	  perform	  cosmetic	  surgeries,	  and	  contracts	  for	  
providing	   services	   for	  weddings	  or	   funerals.	  See,	  e.g.,	   Jarvis	   v.	   Swan	  Tours	   EWCA	  Civ	   8	   (1972)	   (tourism	  
contract);	  Sullivan	  v.	  O'Connor	  296	  N.E.	  2d	  183	  (1973)	  (cosmetic	  surgery);	  Lewis	  v.	  Holmes	  109	  La.	  1030	  
(1903)	  (contract	  for	  providing	  services	  for	  a	  wedding);	  and	  Hirst	  v.	  Elgin	  Metal	  Casket	  Co.,	  438	  F.Supp.	  906	  
(D.Mont.1977) (contract	  for	  manufacturing	  a	  casket).	  	  
23	  Valentine,	   362	   N.W.2d	   628	   (holding	   that	   an	   employment	   contract	   “is	   not	   entered	   into	   primarily	   to	  




2.	  Remedying	  Non-­‐Commercial	  Losses	  
	  
While	   emotional	   damages	   are	   the	   exception,	   plaintiffs	   have	   had	   somewhat	  
greater	   success	   getting	   courts	   to	   recognize	   and	   compensate	   a	   species	   of	   emotional	  
losses	  arising	  from	  defective	  performance.	  The	  plaintiffs	  in	  such	  case	  are	  seeking	  money	  
damages	  to	  undo	  the	  non-­‐conforming	  performance	  and	  redo	  the	  project	  as	  promised,	  
even	   though	   such	   cost	   of	   repair	   might	   be	   significantly	   higher	   than	   the	   diminution	   in	  
market	  value	  that	  the	  defect	  caused.	  Famous	  examples	  involve	  the	  installation	  of	  non-­‐
conforming	  plumbing	  pipes,24	  misplacement	  of	  a	  wall,	  or	  unfinished	  land	  reclamation.25	  
This	   divergence	  between	   the	   two	  measures	  of	   the	   loss—the	   cost	  of	   repair	   versus	   the	  
diminution	   in	   value—is	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  market	   does	   not	   assign	   a	   significant	  
price	   differential	   to	   the	   completed	   performance.	   The	   lower	   market	   valuation	   is	  
sometimes	   taken	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   repair	   is	   entirely	  wasteful	   (as	  when	   the	   plaintiff	  
seeks	  to	  replace	  plumbing	  pipes	  already	   installed	   in	  the	  walls,	   for	  the	  sole	  reason	  that	  
they	  are	  of	  a	  different	  brand).	  But	   it	  may	  also	   indicate	   that	   the	  value	  assigned	  by	   the	  
plaintiff	   to	   a	   specific	   module	   of	   performance,	   or	   to	   its	   meticulous	   completion,	   is	  
subjective	   and	   emotional,	   not	   widely	   shared	   by	   market	   participants	   (as	   when	   the	  
plaintiff	  seeks	  to	  redo	  a	  workmanlike	  exterior	  paint	  job,	  for	  the	  sole	  reason	  that	  it	  was	  
done	   with	   different	   color	   tone	   than	   specified. 26 ).	   Seeking	   the	   cost	   of	   repair	   and	  
completion	  is	  often	  the	  plaintiff’s	  best	  chance	  to	  redress	  the	  emotional	  harm.	  
For	   long,	  courts	  have	  been	  split	  on	  how	  to	  measure	  the	  recovery—whether	  to	  
recognize	  only	  the	  commercial	  loss	  as	  reflected	  in	  the	  diminution	  in	  market	  value,	  or	  to	  
respect	   the	   personal-­‐emotional	   element	   and	   allow	   greater	   compensation	   when	   such	  
element	  was	  bargained-­‐for.	  This	  dilemma	  was	   famously	   framed	  as	  whether	   to	  protect	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
25	  See	  Jacob	  &	  Youngs,	  Inc.	  v.	  Kent,	  230	  N.Y.	  239	  (1921)	  (nonconforming	  pipes);	  Plante	  v.	  Jacobs,	  10	  Wis.	  
2d	  567	  (Wis.	  1960)	  (misplaced	  walls);	  Peevyhouse	  v.	  Garland	  Coal	  &	  Mining	  Co.,	  1962	  OK	  267	  (Okla.	  1962)	  
(unfinished	  land	  reclamation).	  See	  also	  Victor	  P.	  Goldberg,	  Rethinking	  Jacob	  &	  Young	  v.	  Kent,	  66	  WESTERN	  




“mere	   taste	   or	   preference,	   almost	   approaching	   the	   whimsy,”27	  whether	   to	   recognize	  
that	  an	  “owner’s	  right	  to	  improve	  its	  property	  is	  not	  trammeled	  by	  its	  small	  value”	  and	  
that	   a	   party	   may	   “choose	   to	   erect	   a	   monument	   to	   his	   caprice	   or	   folly.”28	  Courts	   ask	  
whether	  the	  in-­‐kind	  completion	  is	  merely	  an	  incidental	  purpose	  of	  the	  contract,29	  or	  is	  it	  
of	  special	  value,	  so	  central	  that	  without	  it	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  contract	  for	  the	  plaintiff	  would	  
be	  frustrated.30	  	  
This	   test—whether	   the	   plaintiff	   had	   some	   personal	   goal	   not	   measured	   by	  
commercial	   value—is	   strikingly	   similar	   to	   the	   test	   for	   emotional	   damages.	   There,	   too,	  
the	   courts	   essentially	   ask	   whether	   the	   plaintiff	   suffered	   injury	   to	   a	   “personal,”	   as	  
opposed	  to	  a	  “commercial,”	  interest.	  But	  the	  test	  has	  been	  applied	  much	  more	  stingily	  
in	   the	   emotional	   damages	   context.	   The	   reason	   for	   the	   differential	   application	   is	  
probably	   the	  measurement	   problem:	   It	   is	   hard	   to	  measure	   pure	   emotional	   harm	   and	  
award	   it	   as	   an	   add-­‐on,	  whereas	   it	   is	   easy	   to	  measure	   the	   cost	   of	   repair	   necessary	   to	  
avoid	  the	  emotional	  harm.	  In	  the	  defective	  performance	  cases,	  plaintiffs	  are	  asking	  for	  
money	   allowance	   not	   to	   compensate	   for	   mental	   anguish,	   but	   to	   avoid	   it.	   Courts	   are	  
finding	   it	  easier	  to	  allot	  such	  compensation,	  accurately	  measured	  so	  as	  to	  finish	  a	   job,	  
than	   to	   speculate	   about	   the	   sum	   of	   money	   necessary	   to	   offset	   emotional	   harm.	   If	  
indeed	   this	   is	   the	   reason	   for	   the	  greater	   readiness	   to	   redress	  emotional	   grievances	   in	  
defective	   performance	   cases,	  we	   suspect	   that	   the	   restoration	  measure	  we	   propose—
which	   solves	   the	   problem	   of	   measurement—would	   encourage	   courts	   to	   expand	   the	  
emotional	  harm	  doctrine	  and	  award	  compensation	  for	  it	  more	  generously.	  
	  
3.	  Emotional	  Harm	  in	  Other	  Remedial	  Doctrines	  	  
	  
Other	  remedial	  rules	  in	  contract	  law	  doctrines	  are	  designed,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  
address	   emotional	   harms.	   Consider	   the	   specific	   performance	   remedy.	   It	   is	   available	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
28	  Groves	  v.	  John	  Wunder	  Co.,	  205	  Minn.	  16,	  ***	  (1939).	  	  
29	  Peevyhouse,	  1962	  OK	  267,	  ***.	  
30	  City	   School	   Dist.	   v.	   McLane	   Constr.	   Co.,	   85	   A.D.2d	   749	   (1981)	   (allowing	   recovery	   for	   cost	   of	   repair	  




primarily	   when	   the	   performance	   sought	   is	   “unique”31 	  and	   damages	   are	   therefore	  
difficult	   to	  ascertain	   so	  as	   to	  make	   the	  aggrieved	  party	   truly	  whole.32	  A	   typical	   reason	  
why	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  contract	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  unique	  and	  damages	  inadequate	  is	  
the	   presence	   of	   an	   emotional	   interest,	   such	   that	   “induce	   strong	   sentimental	  
attachment.” 33 	  When	   buyers	   attach	   idiosyncratic	   emotional	   value	   that	   is	   hard	   to	  
measure,	  market-­‐based	  damages	  would	  leave	  them	  under-­‐compensated,	  unable	  to	  find	  
a	  replacement	  that	  would	  restore	  that	  emotional	  value.34	  	  
Another	   technique	   to	   compensate	   victims	   for	   emotional	   harm	   is	   to	   enforce	  
liquidated	  damages.	  Under	  the	  liquidated	  damages	  doctrine,	  courts	  strike	  down	  agreed-­‐
upon	  damages	   that	  appear	  over-­‐compensatory,	  but	  not	   if	   they	  are	   thought	   to	  protect	  
interest	   otherwise	   not	   compensated	   by	   the	   expectation	   remedy. 35 	  Thus,	   when	  
emotional	   harm	   resulting	   from	   a	   breach	   is	   likely,	   courts	   tend	   to	   uphold	   a	   liquidated	  
damages	  clause	  which	  otherwise	  would	  have	  been	  stricken	  down.36	  
	  
B.	  Tort	  Law	  
Tort	   law	   permits	   recovery	   for	   emotional	   harms	   in	   more	   circumstances	   than	  
contract	   law.	   Primarily,	   when	   an	   injury	   has	   a	   physical	   manifestation,	   the	   emotional	  
distress	   that	  accompanies	   it	   is	   recoverable.	  A	  physical	   injury	   is	   a	   verifiable	   channel	  by	  
which	  emotional	  harm	  is	  generated,	  and	  thus	  claims	  for	  emotional	  damages	  by	  injured	  
victims	   are	   prima	   facie	   plausible 37 	  Conversely,	   stand-­‐alone	   emotional	   harm,	   not	  
accompanied	   by	   physical	   harm,	   is	   generally	   uncompensated	   under	   tort	   law	   unless	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Uniform	   Commercial	   Code	   §	   2-­‐716	   (1)	   ("Specific	   performance	  may	   be	   decreed	  where	   the	   goods	   are	  
unique	  or	  in	  other	  proper	  circumstances.").	  	  
32	  RESTATEMENT	  (SECOND)	  OF	  CONTRACTS	  §	  359(2)	  (1981).	  
33	  RESTATEMENT	  (SECOND)	  OF	  CONTRACTS	  §	  360,	  ***	  (1981).	  
34	  Anthony	  T.	  Kronman,	  Specific	  Performance,	  45	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  351,	  362.	  
35	  Uniform	  Commercial	  Code	  §	  2-­‐718	  (1)	  (referring	  to	  "	  difficulties	  of	  proof	  of	  loss,	  and	  the	  inconvenience	  
or	  nonfeasibility	  of	  otherwise	  obtaining	  an	  adequate	  remedy”	  as	  reasons	  to	  enforce	  liquidated	  damages).	  
RA:	  check	  Charles	  Goetz	  and	  Robert	  E.	  Scott,	  …	  Liquidated	  Damages…	  (***).	  	  
36	  Cite.	  
37	  RESTATEMENT	   (THIRD)	  OF	  TORTS:	   LIABILITY	   FOR	  PHYSICAL	  AND	  EMOTIONAL	  HARM	  §46,	   cmt.	  a	   (2012);	  See	  DAN	  B.	  
DOBBS	  ET	  AL.,	  TORTS	  AND	  COMPENSATION:	  PERSONAL	  ACCOUNTABILITY	  AND	  SOCIAL	  RESPONSIBILITY	   FOR	   INJURY	   581-­‐590	  
(7th	  ed.	  2013)	  (noting	  that	  some	  states	  require	  that	  an	  emotional	  injury	  must	  be	  medically	  diagnosable	  as	  
an	   emotional	   disorder,	   while	   others	   allow	   recovery	   only	   when	   the	   defendant's	   negligence	   caused	   the	  
plaintiff	  a	  physical	  danger,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  emotional	  harm).	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intentionally	   inflicted.38	  Difficulties	   of	   proof,	   the	   risk	   of	   frivolous	   claims	   and	   floodgate	  
concerns	   are	   the	   main	   policy	   considerations	   pulling	   to	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   no-­‐
emotional-­‐damages	  rule.39	  
But	  there	  are	  exceptions.	  Some	  exceptions	  are	  general,	  baked	  into	  torts	  that	  are	  
specifically	   designed	   to	   protect	   against	   non-­‐pecuniary	   wrongs,	   such	   as	   libel	   and	  
intentional	   infliction	   of	   emotional	   distress.40	  Another	   exception	   permits	   plaintiffs	   to	  
secure	  injunctions	  against	  prospective	  tortious	  behavior,	  primarily	  in	  nuisance	  cases.41	  A	  
classic	  explanation	  for	  this	  exception	  offered	  by	  Calabresi	  and	  Melamed—similar	  to	  the	  
justification	   offered	   for	   specific	   performance—suggested	   that	   injunctions	   protect	   the	  
idiosyncratic	   values	   owners	   ascribe	   to	   their	   property	   better	   than	   damages.42	  Rather	  
than	   engage	   in	   the	   inaccurate	   exercise	   of	   repair	   ex	   post,	   the	   law	   allows	   advance	  
injunction.	  
Alongside	   with	   tort	   law,	   environmental	   law	   also	   protects	   against	   emotional	  
harms	  through	  specific	  enactments	  dealing	  with	  enforcement	  against	  polluters.	  Statutes	  
allow	  recovery	  for	  "existence	  value"	  that	  reflects	  the	  psychological	  benefits	  that	  people	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  See	  RESTATEMENT	  (THIRD)	  OF	  TORTS:	  LIABILITY	  FOR	  PHYSICAL	  AND	  EMOTIONAL	  HARM	  §46,	  cmt.	  h.	  ("a	  plaintiff	  must	  
prove	  that	  the	  defendant	  intended	  to	  cause	  severe	  emotional	  harm	  to	  the	  plaintiff").	  See	  also	  Sullivan	  v.	  
Boston	  Gas	  Co.,	  605	  N.E.2d	  805	  (Mass.	  1993)	  (the	  injured	  was	  required	  to	  show	  an	  objective	  evidence	  to	  
the	  emotional	  distress)	  
39	  See	  Kewin,	  295	  N.W.2d	  50,	  416	  (difficulty	  of	  proof);	  Potter	  v.	  Firestone	  Tire	  &	  Rubber	  Co.	  863	  P.2d	  795	  
(Cal.	   1993)	   (floodgates	   concerns);	   See	   also	   DAN	   B.	   DOBBS,	   THE	   LAW	   OF	   TORTS,	   823	   (2000)	   (arguing	   that	  
emotional	  distress	  differs	  from	  one	  plaintiff	  to	  another	  and	  cannot	  easily	  be	  measured	  equally);	  Robert	  J.	  
Rhee,	  A	  Principled	  Solution	  for	  Negligent	  Infliction	  of	  Emotional	  Distress	  Claims,	  36	  ARIZ.	  St.	  L.J.	  805,	  831-­‐
832	  (2004)	  (arguing	  that	  because	  emotional	  distress	  is	  hard	  to	  prove,	  courts	  are	  more	  wary	  of	  fraudulent	  
and	  frivolous	  emotional	  claims).	  For	  a	  recent	  account	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  cases	  where	  emotional	  harm	  is	  
recoverable,	   see	  Robert	  Rabin,	  Dov	   Fox	  on	  Reproductive	  Negligence:	  A	   commentary,	   117	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  
ONLINE	  228	  (2017).	  
40	  In	   negligence	   cases,	   liability	   for	   stand-­‐alone	   emotional	   harm	   has	   also	   been	   imposed	  when	   the	   harm	  
resulted	  from	  injury	  to	  another	  or	  from	  loss	  of	  consortium.	  See	  Thing	  v.	  Lachusa,	  771	  P.2d	  814	  (Cal.	  1989)	  
(obtaining	  damages	  from	  emotional	  distress	  caused	  by	  observing	  the	   injury	  to	  another	   is	  possible	  when	  
the	  plaintiff	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  injured	  victim,	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  present	  at	  the	  scene	  of	  the	  injury,	  and	  as	  
a	  result	  the	  plaintiff	  suffers	  serious	  emotional	  distress);	  Ferriter	  v.	  Daniel	  O'connell's	  Sons,	  Inc.,	  413	  N.E.2d	  
690	  (Mass.	  1980)	  (accepting	  a	  claim	  of	  loss	  of	  parental	  consortium).	  See	  also	  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF 
TORTS, 825 (2000).	   
41	  See	   RESTATEMENT	   (SECOND)	   OF	   TORTS	   ch.	   48	   (1979).	   For	   an	   extend	   review	   on	   the	   injunction	   relief	   in	  
nuisance	  cases,	  see DAN	  B.	  DOBBS,	  LAW	  OF	  REMEDIES	  517-­‐528	  (1993).	  	  
42	  Guido	  Calabresi	  &	  A.	  Douglas	  Melamed,	  Property	  Rules,	  Liability	  Rules,	  and	  Inalienability:	  One	  View	  of	  
the	  Cathedral,	  85	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1089,	  1108	  (1972)	  ("Taney	  may	  be	  sentimentally	  attached	  to	  his	  land.	  As	  a	  
result,	  eminent	  domain	  may	  grossly	  undervalue	  what	  Taney	  would	  actually	   sell	   for,	  even	   if	   it	   sought	   to	  
give	  him	  his	  true	  valuation	  of	  his	  tract.").	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have	  from	  the	  mere	  knowledge	  that	  an	  environmental	  resource	  exists	  and	  will	  continue	  
to	  exist.43	  Under	   various	   federal	   statutes,	   governmental	   trustees	   are	  permitted	   to	   sue	  
polluters	   for	   damages	   to	   natural	   resources,	   including	   “nonuse”	   values	   that	   stand	   for	  
emotional	  harm.	  44	  Wrongdoers	  are	  liable	  for	  "damages	  for	  injury	  to,	  destruction	  of,	  or	  
loss	   of"	   natural	   resources,	   and	   CERCLA	   for	   example	   explicitly	   requires	   that	   "[t]he	  
measure	  of	  damages	  ...	  shall	  not	  be	  limited	  by	  the	  sums	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  restore	  or	  
replace	  such	  resources."45	  In	  the	  few	  cases	  decided	  by	  courts,	  damages	  were	  awarded	  
for	  aesthetic	  and	  existence	  values,	  both	  surrogates	  for	  types	  of	  emotional	  harm.46	  
Similar	   to	   contract	   law,	   tort	   law	   allows	   recovery	   for	   costs	   of	   repairing	   a	  
damaged	  property	  even	  if	  those	  costs	  far	  exceed	  diminution	  in	  the	  property's	  objective	  
value.	  This	  is	  done	  mostly	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  damaged	  property	  has	  special	  non-­‐market	  
value,	   where	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	   property	   led	   to	   emotional	  
disturbance.47	  A	   typical	   example	   is	   the	   Trinity	   Church	   case.	   An	   excavation	   contractor	  
caused	  damage	  to	  the	  adjacent	  Trinity	  Church.	  The	  only	  way	  to	  repair	  the	  church,	  which	  
had	   some	   damage	   prior	   to	   the	   accident,	   was	   by	   complete	   demolition	   and	  
reconstruction.	  The	  damage	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  value	  of	  the	  church	  to	  the	  congregation,	  
yet	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  court	  allowed	  recovery.48	  
Both	  the	  environmental	  cases	  and	  the	  special-­‐use	  property	  cases	  (like	  religious	  
institutions)	  deal	  with	  harms	   to	  public	  or	   jointly	   consumed	  goods.	  Remedies	  aimed	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Note,	  Existence-­‐Value	  Standing,	  129	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  775	  (2016).	  
44See Clean Water Act	   33	   U.S.C.	   §§	   1251-­‐1387	   (2012);	   Oil	   Pollution	   Act	   Id.	   §§	   2701-­‐61	   (2012);	   and	  
Comprehensive	  Environmental	  Response,	  Compensation,	  and	  Liability	  Act	  (CERCLA),	  42	  U.S.C.	  §§	  9601-­‐75	  
(2016).	  
45 Id.	  §	  9607(f).. 
46	  Dobbins,	  supra	  note	  45,	  at	  911.	  See	  Note,	  supra	  note	  43,	  at	  782-­‐783	  (summarizing	  the	  case	  law	  on	  this	  
matter).	  
47	  See	   Mieske	   v.	   Bartell	   Drug	   Co.,	   92	  Wn.2d	   40,	   44	   (Wash.	   Apr.	   19,	   1979)	   (awarding	   damages	   for	   the	  
intrinsic	  value	  of	   the	   loss	  of	  a	  home	  movie	   film	   that	  held	  special	   family	  memories,	  which	  exceeded	   the	  
objective	  value	  of	  the	  film	  roll	  itself);	  La	  Porte	  v.	  Associated	  Independents,	  Inc.,	  163	  So.	  2d	  267	  (Fla.	  Apr.	  3,	  
1964)	  (awarding	  damages	  for	  the	  emotional	  distress	  caused	  by	  the	  killing	  of	  a	  pet).	  
48	  Trinity	   Church	   in	   Boston	   v.	   John	   Hancock	   Mut.	   Life	   Ins.	   Co.,	   399	   Mass.	   43,	   50	   (1987).	   The	   court	  
accounted	  for	  the	  preexisting	  condition	  by	  calculating	  damages	  at	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  
the	  destruction	  level	  of	  the	  church	  before	  and	  after	  the	  infliction	  of	  the	  harm	  (which	  was	  39%),	  multiplied	  
by	  costs	  of	  reconstruction.	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restoring	   the	   in-­‐kind	   integrity	   of	   such	   assets	   benefit	   the	   public—often	   by	   creating	  
emotional	  benefits—and	  thus	  courts	  are	  more	  ready	  to	  award	  costs	  of	  repair.	  
*	  *	  *	  
This	  brief	  tour	  across	  the	  private	  law’s	  remedy	  doctrines	  addresses	  the	  question	  
when	  are	  emotional	  harms	  recoverable.	  The	  answer,	  in	  a	  nutshell,	  is—not	  often.	  In	  the	  
next	  Part	  of	  the	  Article,	  we	  switch	  to	  a	  different	  inquiry:	  How	  to	  make	  emotional	  harm	  
recoverable.	  We	  develop	  a	  new	  remedy,	  which	  we	   think	  solves	   some	  of	   the	  problems	  
with	   the	   existing	   remedies	   for	   emotional	   harm,	   and—if	   adopted—should	   be	   used	   to	  
extend	  significantly	  the	  scope	  of	  recovery	  for	  emotional	  harm.	  	  
	  
II.	  The	  Restoration	  Measure	  of	  Damages	  
	  
There	   are	   two	   main	   legally	   recognized	   methods	   to	   value	   the	   harm	   for	   the	  
purpose	   of	   making	   the	   plaintiff	   whole.	   One—the	   money	   method—is	   an	   award	   of	  
damages	  necessary	  to	  offset	  the	  measured	  reduction	  in	  the	  harmed	  party’s	  welfare,	  for	  
example	   just	   enough	   to	   purchase	   substitutes	   for	   the	   destroyed	   property	   or	   for	   the	  
breached	  promise.	  The	  other—the	  in-­‐kind	  method—is	  to	  undo	  or	  prevent	  the	  harm	  by	  
preserving	  the	  pre-­‐harm	  state	  of	  affairs,	  for	  example	  through	  an	  injunction	  or	  an	  order	  
of	   specific	   performance.	   That	   which	   was	   taken	   (or	   was	   about	   to	   be	   taken)	   from	   the	  
plaintiff	  is	  given	  back,	  in	  kind.	  Under	  the	  money	  method,	  the	  harmed	  party	  is	  awarded	  
cash	  and	  may	   (but	  need	  not)	  use	   it	   to	  purchase	  exact	   replacement.	  Under	   the	   in-­‐kind	  
method,	   the	   harmed	   party	   receives	   no	   compensation,	   but	   her	   interest	   in	   the	  
preservation	  of	  the	  violation-­‐free	  status	  quo	  is	  secured.	  
We	  develop	   a	   third,	   hybrid,	  method—restoration	  damages—which	   consists	   of	  
an	  order	  to	  pay	  money	  not	  directly	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  but	  instead	  to	  finance	  the	  actual	  in-­‐
kind	   reclamation	   of	   a	   close	   replacement.	   The	   restoration	   remedy	   is	   like	   the	   money	  
method	  because	   it	   requires	  the	  defendant	  to	  pay	  damages.	  But	   it	   is	  unlike	  the	  money	  
method	   because	   it	   is	   not	   paid	   to	   the	   plaintiff,	   but	   rather	   directly	   to	   complete	   a	  
restoration	  project.	   The	   restoration	   remedy	   is	   also	   like	   the	   in-­‐kind	  method	  because	   it	  
gives	  the	  plaintiff	  not	  an	  allowance	  but	  rather	  an	  actual	  completed	  restoration.	  But	  it	  is	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unlike	  the	  in-­‐kind	  method	  because	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  a	  reversal.	  It	  does	  not	  restore	  the	  
exact	  manifestation	  of	  the	  interest	  that	  was	  violated,	  but	  rather	  a	  substitute	  to	  it.	  
	  We	   begin	   by	   presenting	   the	   technique.	  We	   then	   discuss	   areas	   in	   which	   it	   is	  
arguably	  superior	  to	  the	  money	  and	  the	  in-­‐kind	  methods,	  and	  consider	  some	  problems	  
in	  its	  implementation.	  In	  particular,	  we	  explain	  that	  the	  restoration	  remedy	  might	  be	  too	  
expensive	  for	  the	  defendant	  and	  we	  suggest	  a	  sorting	  mechanism	  that	  ameliorates	  this	  
concern.	   Finally,	  we	   distinguish	   the	   restoration	   remedy	   from	   the	   remedy	   occasionally	  
awarded	  in	  class	  actions	  that	  is	  aimed	  at	  promoting	  a	  societal	  cause.	  	  
	  
A. The	  Principle:	  Least	  Cost	  Restoration	  
	  
1.	  The	  “Underlying	  Interest”	  
	  
Any	   violation	   of	   a	   right—contractual	   or	   property—hurts	   some	   underlying	  
interest.	  At	  the	  most	  general	  level,	  a	  violation	  reduces	  the	  aggrieved	  party’s	  “utility”	  and	  
thus	  hurts	  the	  underlying	  interest	  of	  maximizing	  one’s	  utility.	  At	  the	  most	  concrete	  level,	  
a	   violation	   denies	   the	   aggrieved	   party’s	   plan	   to	   derive	   specific	   benefits	   from	   an	  
identified	  asset,	  and	  thus	  hurts	  the	  underlying	  interest	  associated	  with	  this	  precise	  plan.	  
Damage	   remedies	   adopt	   the	  most	   general	   concept	   of	   an	   underlying	   interest,	  
aiming	  to	  restore	  the	  aggrieved	  party’s	  utility	  by	  an	  award	  of	  money	  sufficient	  to	  offset	  
the	   reduction	   of	   utility	   caused	   by	   the	   violation.	   In-­‐kind	   remedies	   adopt	   the	   most	  
concrete	   concept	   of	   an	   underlying	   interest,	   aiming	   to	   restore	   the	   aggrieved	   party’s	  
specific	  use	  and	  enjoyment	  arising	  from	  an	  identified	  plan	  that	  was	  drawn	  prior	  to	  the	  
violation.	  
But	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  “underlying	  interest”	  does	  not	  need	  to	  take	  one	  of	  these	  
two	  polar	  manifestations.	  The	  aggrieved	  party’s	  violated	  plan	  may	  have	  taken	  a	  specific	  
manifestation,	  but	  it	  was	  intended	  to	  advance	  a	  more	  general	  personal	  agenda.	  Yet	  this	  
more	  general	  agenda	  need	  not	  have	  been	   the	  abstract,	   tautological,	  all	  encompassing	  
‘utility	  maximization’—it	   could	  have	  been	   the	  advancement	  of	   a	   specific	   intermediate	  
organizing	  value	  or	  preference,	  one	  that	  could	  be	  advanced	  by	  close	  substitutes.	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Critical	  to	  the	  design	  of	  restoration	  damages	  is	  the	  conceptual	  existence	  of	  such	  
intermediate	   underlying	   interest.	   It	   is	   an	   organizing	   goal	   that	   a	   person	   has,	   which	  
dictates	   the	   specific	   choices	  made.	   An	   underlying	   interest	  may	   be	   a	   taste,	   a	   value,	   a	  
need	  or	  necessity,	  a	  political	  or	   religious	  preference,	  an	   ideology—it	   is	   the	  motivation	  
for	  the	  specific	  choices.	  Importantly,	  an	  underlying	  interest	  can	  be	  advanced	  by	  various	  
substitute	   courses	   of	   actions,	   and	   thus	   if	   one	   effort	   to	   advance	   it	   is	   thwarted,	   other	  
efforts	  can	  be	  used	  to	  accomplish	  an	  approximate	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  same	  interest.	  	  
Consider,	   for	  example,	  a	  religious	  or	  political	  preference	  relating	  to	  one’s	  diet,	  
which	   is	  manifested	  by	  a	  plan	  to	  eat	  only	  vegetarian	   food.	  A	  violation	  of	   this	  plan,	   for	  
example,	   by	   deceptively	   labeling	   a	   canned	   soup	   product	   ‘vegetarian’	   despite	   being	  
prepared	   with	   meat	   stock,	   impairs	   the	  most	   general	   interest	   of	   the	   deceived	   buyers	  
(maximizing	  utility)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  most	  concrete	  interest	  (eating	  a	  vegetarian	  soup).	  But	  
it	  is	  best	  viewed	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  an	  intermediate	  underlying	  interest	  –	  the	  reduction	  of	  
overall	  meat	  consumption.	  This	  intermediate	  underlying	  interest	  may	  be	  the	  concern	  for	  
animal	  welfare,	  namely	  the	  interest	  to	  protect	  some	  species	  of	  animals	  from	  slaughter;	  
or	   it	   may	   concern	   environmental	   protection,	   namely	   the	   interest	   to	   protect	   the	  
environment	   from	   the	   harms	   caused	   by	   mass	   meat	   production;	   or	   it	   may	   concern	  
physical	  health,	  namely	  the	  perceived	  effect	  of	  meat	  consumption	  on	  private	  or	  public	  
health.	  49	  	  
Identifying	  the	   intermediate	  underlying	   interest	  makes	   it	  possible	  employ	  new	  
forms	   of	   remedies.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   intermediate	   interest,	   the	   only	   in-­‐kind	  
remedy	   is	   a	   reversal	   of	   the	   concrete	   harm.	   If	   such	   reversal	   is	   impossible	   the	   only	  
remaining	   remedy	   is	   money	   damages	   aimed	   to	   undo	   the	   reduction	   in	   the	   aggrieved	  
party’s	   total	  utility.	  That	   is,	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  an	   intermediate	  underlying	   interest,	   the	  
remedial	  toolkit	   is	   limited	  to	  the	  two	  polar	  methods.	  But	  if	  an	  intermediate	  underlying	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Charlotte	  J.	  S.	  De	  Backer	  &	  Liselot	  Hudders,	  From	  Meatless	  Mondays	  to	  Meatless	  Sundays:	  Motivations	  
for	  Meat	   Reduction	   among	  Vegetarians	   and	   Semi-­‐vegetarians	  Who	  Mildly	   or	   Significantly	   Reduce	   Their	  
Meat	   Intake	   53	   ECOLOGY	  OF	  FOOD	  AND	  NUTRITION	   639	   (2014)	   (exploring	   vegetarians’	  motives	   for	   reducing	  
their	  meat	  consumption);	  Matthew	  B.	  Ruby,	  Vegetarianism.	  A	  blossoming	  field	  of	  study,	  58	  APPETITE	  141,	  
142	  (2012)	  (same).	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interest	  exists	  and	  is	  identified,	  an	  in-­‐kind	  remedy	  can	  be	  tailored	  to	  reversal,	  not	  of	  the	  
actual	  concrete	  harm,	  but	  rather	  of	  the	  harm	  done	  to	  the	  underlying	  interest.	  
	  
2.	  Restoration	  	  
	  
Restoration	   damages	   do	   not	   aim	   to	   give	   the	   aggrieved	   party	   the	   money	  
equivalent	  of	  her	  loss,	  not	  to	  reverse	  the	  specific	  and	  concrete	  injury	  she	  suffered.	  The	  
vegetarian	   who	  was	   led	   to	   eat	   a	  meat	   product	   is	   not	   going	   to	   collect	   “make	  whole”	  
damages	  (however	  such	  criterion	   is	  measured);	  and	  there	   is	  of	  course	  no	  way	  to	  flush	  
the	   consumed	   soup	  out	  of	   her	   body	   (which,	   in	   any	   event,	  would	  not	   accomplish	   true	  
reversal,	   since	   the	   animal	   was	   already	   cooked).	   Instead,	   restoration	   damages	   require	  
the	  wrongdoer	   to	   take	   an	   action	   that	  would	   undo	   the	   harm	   to	   the	   aggrieved	   party’s	  
intermediate	  underlying	   interest—restore	  the	  psychic	  satisfaction	  that	  was	  the	  subject	  
of	  her	  plan	  to	  eat	  a	  vegetarian	  meal.	  	  
Under	   restoration	   damages,	   the	  wrongdoer	  would	   be	   ordered	   to	   pay	  money,	  
earmarked	   for	   the	   advancement	   of	   a	   goal	   aligned	   with	   the	   underlying	   interest.	   The	  
money	  would	  not	  be	  paid	   to	   the	  aggrieved	  party.	  Rather,	   it	  would	  be	  paid	  directly	   to	  
complete	   a	   different	   in-­‐kind	   project,	   proposed	   by	   the	   plaintiff	   and	   approved	   by	   the	  
court	   to	  match	   the	   underlying	   interest	   that	   the	   violation	   allegedly	   harmed.	   There	   are	  
many	  ways	   to	   design	   such	   a	   remedy	   aimed	   at	   restoration	   of	   the	   underlying	   interest.	  
Importantly,	  such	  design	  ought	  to	  follow	  several	  guidelines.	  
What	  Is	  the	  Underlying	  Interest?	  Unlike	  physical	  harm,	  psychic	  interests	  are	  hard	  
to	  verify.	  Restoration	  damages	  would	  rely	  on	  a	  plaintiff’s	  declaration	  which	  interest	  was	  
damaged.	   In	   the	  vegetarian	  example,	  we	   saw	   that	   there	   could	  be	  a	   variety	  of	  psychic	  
interests,	  with	  different	   victims	   requiring	  different	   restoration	   targets.	   In	   such	   case,	   if	  
the	   victims	  banded	   together	   in	   a	   collective	   action,	   the	   restoration	  damages	  would	  be	  
divided	  and	  distributed	  to	  different	  targets,	   to	  repair	  different	  emotional	  harms.	  Since	  
the	  identification	  of	  the	  injured	  interest	  depends	  on	  a	  declaration	  by	  the	  plaintiff,	  there	  
is	  a	  fundamental	  problem	  of	  sincerity.	  We	  show	  below	  how	  to	  overcome	  it.	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Declaration	   by	   the	   plaintiff	   is	   one,	   but	   not	   the	   only,	   way	   to	   identify	   the	  
underlying	   interest.	   Other	   ways	   would	   be	   to	   employ	   representative	   surveys	   of	   like	  
populations, 50 	  experiments, 51 	  Big	   Data, 52 	  statistics, 53 	  and	   expert	   opinions. 54 	  These	  
methods	   seek	   to	   identify	   social	   and	   psychological	   regularities,	   helping	   identify	   the	  
intensity	  of	  the	  emotional	  distress.	  They	  could	  also	  quantify	  the	  amount	  of	  restoration	  
needed.	   Surveys	   or	   other	  methods	   of	   eliciting	   revealed	   preferences	   could	   show	   how	  
much	  restoration	  is	  needed	  to	  offset	  the	  emotional	  harm.55	  	  
Which	   Underlying	   Interests	   Deserve	   Restoration?	   This	   question	   poses	   a	  
fundamental	  challenge—when	  to	   impose	   liability	  for	  emotional	  harm—and	  it	   is	   largely	  
independent	   of	   the	   question	   how	   to	   compensate	   once	   liability	   is	   established.	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  See,	  e.g.,	  the	  contingent	  valuation	  method	  (CVM)	  that	  is	  used	  to	  estimate	  nonuse	  damages,	  described	  
at	  supra	  note	  45.	  But	  cf.	  W.	  kip	  Viscusi,	  The	  Value	  of	  Life	  in	  Legal	  Contexts:	  Survey	  and	  Critique	  2	  AM.	  L.	  &	  
ECON.	  REV.	  195	  (2000)	  (criticizing	  the	  use	  of	  surveys	  to	  estimate	  compensation	  for	  hedonic	  damages).	  
51	  RA:	  experiments,	  NOT	  epidemiological	  studies.	  	  
52	  Cf.	  Bruce	  R.	  Lindsay,	  Social	  media	  and	  disasters:	  Current	  uses,	  future	  options,	  and	  policy	  considerations,	  
4	   JOURNAL	   OF	   CURRENT	   ISSUES	   IN	   MEDIA	   AND	   TELECOMMUNICATIONS	   4	   (2011),	   available	   at	  
https://www.nisconsortium.org/portal/resources/bin/Social_Media_and_Dis_1423591240.pdf	  
(suggesting	  to	  use	  social	  media	  in	  emergencies	  and	  disasters,	  in	  order	  to	  accelerate	  the	  damage	  estimate	  
process).	  
53	  The	  use	  of	  statistical	  data	  is	  common	  in	  tort	  cases,	  where	  actuarial	  tables	  are	  employed	  to	  establish	  a	  
victim's	   earning	   capacity	   or	  work	   and	   life	   expectancy.	   See,	   e.g.,	  Karpov	   v.	   Net	   Trucking,	   Inc.,	   U.S.	   Dist.	  
LEXIS	  129130,	  5-­‐6	  (N.D.	   Ind.	  2010)	  (using	  statistical	   tables	   in	  order	  to	  calculate	  the	   injurer's	   lost	  earning	  
capacity);	  RESTATEMENT	  (SECOND)	  OF	  TORTS	  §	  924	  cmt.	  e	  (1981)	  (“In	  the	  case	  of	  permanent	  injuries	  or	  injuries	  
causing	  death,	  it	  is…	  permissible	  to	  use	  mortality	  tables	  and	  other	  evidence	  as	  to	  the	  average	  expectancy	  
of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  persons).	  
54	  See	  FED.	  R.	  CIV.	  P.	  35	  (2007)	  (providing	  that	  when	  the	  mental	  condition	  of	  a	  plaintiff	  seeking	  emotional	  
damages	   is	  at	   issue	   in	  a	   lawsuit,	   the	  court	  may	  order	   that	  party	   to	  undergo	  a	  mental	  examination	  by	  a	  
physician	  or	  psychologist);	  Eskin	  v.	  Bartee,	  262	  S.W.3d	  727,	  735	   (Tenn.	  2008)	   (requiring	  evidence	   in	   the	  
form	  of	  expert	  proof	  establishing	  that	  "the	  plaintiff's	  emotional	  distress	  is	  'serious'	  or	  'severe'");	  Olden	  v.	  
LaFarge	   Corp.	   383	   F.3d	   495,	   509	   (6th	   Cir.	   2004)	   (holding	   that	   the	   amount	   of	   damages	   occurred	   to	  
plaintiffs,	  can	  be	  estimated	  by	  experts).	  
55	  MACALISTER	  ELLIOTT	  ET	  AL.,	  STUDY	  ON	  THE	  VALUATION	  AND	  RESTORATION	  OF	  BIODIVERSITY	  DAMAGE	  FOR	  THE	  PURPOSE	  OF	  
ENVIRONMENTAL	   LIABILITY	   4-­‐10	   (2001),	   available	   at	  
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/biodiversity_annexes.pdf	   (presenting	   the	   main	  
economic	  approaches	  that	  are	  used	  to	  evaluate	  damages	  to	  natural	  resources.	  One	  of	  them	  is	  "revealed	  
preference	   technique,"	  which	   uses	   the	   price	   of	   other	   goods	   and	   services	   to	   elicit	   people’s	   demand	   for	  
environmental	  resources.	  Another	  approach	  is	  "Stated	  preference	  technique,”	  which	  uses	  survey	  methods	  
in	  which	  hypothetical	  markets	  are	  created	  by	  way	  of	  structured	  questionnaires	  for	  respondents	  to	  express	  
their	   preferences.	   For	   a	   criticism	   on	   the	   use	   of	   stated	   preferences	   surveys	   to	   estimate	   damages,	   see	  
Viscusi,	  supra	  note	  50.	  See	  also	  W.	  Kip	  Viscusi,	  Alternative	  Approaches	   to	  Valuing	  the	  Health	   Impacts	  of	  
Accidents:	   Liability	   Law	   and	   Prospective	   Evaluations,	   46	   LAW	   &	   CONTEMP.	   PROBS.	   49,	   58	   (1983)	   ("The	  
principal	  difficulty	  [with	  surveys]	  is	  that	  interviews	  may	  not	  elicit	  accurate	  responses	  because	  respondents	  
have	  no	  incentive	  to	  give	  thoughtful	  or	  honest	  answers.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  emphasis	  has	  been	  on	  analyzing	  
the	  implicit	  trade-­‐offs	  revealed	  in	  actual	  decisions").	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liability	   question	   is	   hard	  because	   every	   contract	   breach	   and	  every	   tort	   injury	   leads	   to	  
emotional	   disturbance,	   and	   even	   after	   make-­‐whole	   damages	   are	   paid	   some	   anguish	  
may	  linger	  for	  the	  ordeal	  involved	  in	  the	  violation	  of	  one’s	  rights.	  But	  the	  law,	  we	  saw,	  is	  
stingy.	   Contract	   and	   tort	   law	   doctrines	   protect	   against	   emotional	   harms	   only	   in	   a	  
relatively	  small	  subset	  of	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  they	  are	  recognized	  to	  occur.	  Nevertheless,	  
the	  liability	  and	  damages	  questions	  may	  be	  interdependent.	  If	  restoration	  damages	  are	  
easy	  to	  assess,	  courts	  may	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  impose	  liability	  for	  emotional	  harm.	  And,	  
conversely,	   if	   it	   is	   exceedingly	   expensive	   to	   restore	   the	   underlying	   interest,	   liability	   is	  
less	  likely.	  	  
Measuring	  Restoration.	  The	  primary	  purpose	  of	  restoration	  damages	  is	  to	  avoid	  
converting	   psychic	   losses	   into	   dollars.	   If	   the	   purpose	   is	   to	   restore	   the	   underlying	  
interest,	   the	   law	   needs	   to	   identify	   avenues	   by	   which	   such	   restoration	   may	   be	  
accomplished.	  A	  problem	  of	  measurement	  still	  lingers,	  however.	  How	  much	  to	  invest	  in	  
the	   substitute	   in-­‐kind	   restoration?	   Sometimes	   this	   problem	   is	   trivial,	   as	   when	   the	  
underlying	  interest	  is	  measured	  by	  a	  quantitative	  metric.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  emotional	  
loss	   arises	   from	   excessive	   pollution	   emissions,	   an	   offsetting	   reduction	   of	   emissions	  
elsewhere	  would	   achieve	   in	   kind	   restoration.	  But	  other	   times	   the	  problem	   is	   hard,	   as	  
when	  the	  underlying	   interest	   is	  qualitative	  and	  not	  restorable	  by	  close	  substitutes.	  For	  
example,	  if	  the	  emotional	  loss	  arises	  from	  unintended	  consumption	  of	  non-­‐kosher	  food,	  
restoration	   damages	   should	   be	   paid	   for	   an	   offsetting	   religious	   promotion.	   But	   what	  
constitutes	   religious	   promotion?	  And	  how	  much	   is	   enough?	   (We	  are	   reminded	  of	   the	  
humorous	  quip,	  “ask	  two	  Jews,	  you’ll	  get	  three	  opinions.”).	  	  
The	   measurement	   of	   restoration	   must	   deal	   with	   another	   difficulty—the	  
intensity	   of	   the	   emotional	   harm.	   In	   all	   our	   examples,	   involving	   environmentalists,	  
vegetarians,	   and	   religious	   people,	   the	   degree	   of	   emotional	   disturbance	   varies	   across	  
people.56	  At	  times	  courts	  might	  have	  information	  about	  the	  intensity	  of	  preferences	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  In	   class	   action	   lawsuit,	   it	   is	   common	   that	   different	   class	   members	   will	   suffer	   different	   damages.	  
Although	   Fed.	   R.	   Civ	   P.	   23	   (2017)	   requires	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   commonality	   among	   the	  members	   of	   the	  
group,	  variation	  in	  damages	  does	  not	  necessarily	  prevent	  the	  certification	  of	  a	  class.	  See	  e.g.,	  De	  La	  Fuente	  
v.	  Stokely-­‐Van	  Camp,	  Inc.,	  713	  F.2d	  225,	  233	  (7th	  Cir.	  Ill.,1983).	  But	  cf.	  Wal-­‐Mart	  Stores,	  Inc.	  v.	  Dukes,	  564	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could	  adjust	  the	  restoration	  measure	  accordingly.	  Other	  times,	  they	  would	  have	  to	  use	  
averages	   and	   approximations.	   This	   is	   a	   standard	   methodological	   challenge	   for	   any	  
damage	  measure,	  and	  standard	  solutions	  should	  apply	  to	  restoration	  damages.	  	  
The	  measurement	   of	   restoration	   would	   be	   difficult	   in	  many	   cases,	   but	   never	  
more	  difficult	  than	  the	  alternative	  of	  assessing	  simple	  money	  damages,	  which	  not	  only	  
requires	   to	   assess	   the	   intensity	   of	   the	   emotional	   harm,	   but	   also	   to	   set	   an	   arbitrary	  
exchange	   rate	   harm/dollars.	  We	   think	   that	   it	   is	   better	   to	   approximate	   the	   underlying	  
interest	  and	  provide	  a	  rough	  quantification	  of	  it,	  than	  to	  concoct	  a	  sum	  of	  money	  that	  is	  
supposed	  to	  equal	  the	  emotional	  harm.	  We	  show	  in	  Section	  II.B	  below	  that	  even	  a	  rough	  
approximation	  of	  a	  restoration	  remedy	  would	  have	  the	  very	  desirable	  effect	  that	  money	  
damages	   lack,	   of	   weeding	   out	   fake	   claims.	   Still,	   we	   recognize	   that	   significant	  
measurement	  problems	  might	  at	  times	  limit	  the	  application	  of	  restoration	  damages,	  or	  
at	   the	   very	   least	   condition	   its	   application	   of	   plaintiffs’	   success	   in	   proposing	   reliable	  
methods	  of	  measurement.	  	  
Least	   Cost	   Restoration.	   After	   the	   harm	   to	   underlying	   interest	   is	   verified	   and	  
potential	  restoration	  avenues	  are	  established,	  which	  one	  should	  be	  selected?	  Plaintiffs	  
would	  naturally	  ask	  for	  the	  most	  generous	  allowances	  to	  promote	  those	  interests,	  and	  
perhaps	  also	  ones	  that	  have	  self-­‐serving	  side	  effects.	  For	  example,	  a	  vegetarian	  driven	  
by	  animal	  welfare	  may	  ask	  for	  a	  contribution	  to	  a	  specific	  animal	  shelter,	  one	  that	  she	  
manages.	  Here,	  we	  make	  one	  obvious	  point:	  select	  the	  least	  cost	  restoration	  measure.	  
This	   thrift	   criterion	   should	   also	   help	   narrow	   down	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   recognized	  
underlying	  interest.	  The	  animal	  welfare	  agenda	  may	  be	  broad	  (protect	  all	  farm	  animals)	  
or	  narrow	  (protect	  only	  the	  animals	  used	  in	  the	  case),	  and	  restoration	  damages	  could	  be	  
directed	   to	   advance	   the	  different	   interests.	   It	  will	   sometimes	  be	   cheaper	   to	   restore	   a	  
broader	  interest	  because	  more	  options	  are	  available,	  and	  other	  times	  cheaper	  to	  pursue	  
directly	  the	  narrow	  set	  of	  interests.	  	  
Relation	  to	  Cy	  Pres.	  The	  restoration	  remedy	  bears	  superficial	  resemblance	  to	  a	  
rarely	  used	  remedy—a	  cy	  pres	  distribution	  made	  in	  class	  actions.	  These	  are	  settlement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
U.S.	  338,	  350	  (2011)	  ("Commonality	  requires	  a	  plaintiff	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  class	  members	  have	  suffered	  
the	  same	  injury").	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awards	   for	   the	   indirect	   benefit	   of	   the	   class,	   usually	   to	   third	   party	   recipients	   whose	  
interests	   reasonably	   approximate	   those	   being	   pursued	   by	   the	   class.	  57	  Courts	   approve	  
settlements	   that	   contain	   cy	   pres	   distributions	   as	   an	   exception,	   only	   when	   individual	  
distributions	  are	  not	  viable.	  As	  far	  as	  we	  know,	  cy	  pres	  has	  not	  been	  designed	  nor	  used	  
for	  repairing	  emotional	  harm.	  
Like	   cy	   pres,	   restoration	   damages	   rely	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   underlying	  
impaired	   value	   that	   can	   be	   restored.	   But	   unlike	   cy	   pres,	   we	   envision	   restoration	  
damages	  as	  the	  rule,	  not	  the	  exception,	  and	  not	   just	   in	  settlements.	  When	  a	  claim	  for	  
emotional	  harm	  is	  made,	  individual	  remedies	  are	  often	  viable	  (and	  thus,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  
current	  doctrine,	  cy	  pres	  would	  not	  be	  available).	  Yet	  it	  is	  precisely	  in	  this	  core	  case	  that	  
restoration	   damages	   should	   be	   preferred	   to	   direct	   compensation.	   Cy	   pres	   payments	  
might	  occasionally	  function	  as	  restoration,	  but	  note	  they	  are	  not	   intended	  nor	  used	  to	  
offset	  emotional	  harm.	  	  
Because	   the	   restoration	   damages	   scheme	   is	   designed	   primarily	   to	   redress	  
emotional	  harms,	  it	  operates	  both	  in	  public	  and	  private	  harm	  cases.	  It	  has	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  
problem	   that	   cy	   pres	   ignores:	   distinguishing	   sincere	   claimants	   from	   fakers.	   Unlike	   cy	  
pres,	   which	   is	   award	   to	   the	   class	   a	   whole,	   the	   restoration	   damages	   scheme	   has	   an	  
additional	   critical	   step:	   self-­‐selection	  by	   claimants.	   It	   is	   this	   step	   that	   the	  next	   section	  
describes.	  	  
	  
B.	  Election	  of	  Remedy	  
1.	  The	  Problem	  
	  
The	   two	   key	   challenges	   of	   any	   regime	   aiming	   to	   remedy	   emotional	   harm	   are	  
valuation	  and	  verification.	  We	  argued	  above	  that	  the	  restoration	  remedy	  addresses	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  See,	  generally,	  Principles	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Aggregate	  Litigation	  §	  3.07	  (2010).	  For	  an	  example	  of	  such	  use	  of	  
cy	   pres,	   see	   Block	   v.	   McDonald's	   Corp.,	   355	   Ill.	   App.	   3d	   1174	   (2005)	   (class	   action	   against	   McDonald's	  
alleging	  it	  mixed	  into	  the	  french	  fries	  beef	  flavoring,	  despite	  claiming	  that	  the	  fries	  were	  vegetarian.	  In	  the	  
settlement,	   McDonalds	   agreed	   to	   apologize	   to	   all	   Hindu	   and	   vegetarians	   clients	   who	   were	   offended.	  
McDonald	   had	   also	   agreed	   to	   pay	   $10	   million	   to	   various	   vegetarian,	   Hindu	   and	   Jewish	   non-­‐profit	  
organizations);	   Bruno	   v.	   Superior	   Court,	   179	   Cal.Rptr.	   342	   (Cal.	   Ct.	   App.	   1981)	  (case	   alleging	   unlawful	  
fixing	  of	  milk	  prices	  and	  seeking,	  inter	  alia,	  lowering	  of	  milk	  prices	  in	  affected	  area);	  In	  re	  Holocaust	  Victim	  
Assets	   Litig.,	   424	   F.3d	   132	   (2d	   Cir.	   2005) (victims	   of	   Nazi	   looting);	   Kerry	   Barnett,	  Equitable	   Trusts:	   An	  
Effective	  Remedy	  in	  Consumer	  Class	  Actions,	  96	  YALE	  L.J.	  1591	  (1987) (giving	  case	  examples).	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first	   problem	   of	   valuation	   by	   paying	   for	   in-­‐kind	   substitution	   and	   thus	   rendering	   it	  
unnecessary	   to	   measure	   the	   dollar	   equivalent	   of	   an	   emotional	   harm.	   But	   a	   second	  
fundamental	  problem	  looms,	  also	  due	  to	  the	  incommensurability	  of	  emotional	  harms—
the	  problem	  of	  verification.	  How	  do	  we	  know	  that	  a	  party	  seeking	  restoration	  damages	  
was	  truly	  emotionally	  distressed?	  If	  the	  harm	  is	  to	  a	  public	  good,	  how	  can	  we	  be	  certain	  
that	   only	   plaintiffs	   who	   value	   the	   public	   good	   would	   be	   counted	   in	   calculating	   the	  
necessary	   restoration?	   Furthermore,	   even	   if	   we	  were	   certain	   that	   a	   plaintiff	   suffered	  
emotional	  harm,	  her	  harm	  might	  be	  too	  small	  to	  warrant	  costly	  restoration.	  How	  can	  we	  
avoid	  such	  wasteful	  restoration?	  (This	  last	  problem	  disappears	  if	  it	  is	  clear	  to	  the	  court	  
that	  the	  cost	  of	  restoration	  is	  lower	  than	  all	  plaintiffs'	  combined	  emotional	  harm.).	  	  
But	   this	   is	   not	   always	   the	   case.	   Return	   to	   the	   mislabeled	   vegetarian	   soup	  
example.	  All	  patrons	  were	  deceived,	  but	  only	  patrons	  with	  vegetarian	  preferences	  were	  
emotionally	  harmed,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  their	  harms	  that	  need	  to	  be	  restored.	  But	  what	  would	  
stop	  other	  non-­‐vegetarian	  customers	  from	  piling	  on	  fake	  claims	  of	  emotional	  harm?	  In	  
particular,	   if	   the	   lawsuit	   is	   brought	   as	   a	   class	   action	   on	   behalf	   of	   all	   consumers	   who	  
purchased	   the	  mislabeled	   product,	   how	   can	   the	   court	   determine	   the	   fraction	   among	  
them	   who	   truly	   suffered	   harm	   to	   their	   underlying	   vegetarian	   interest,	   and	   separate	  
them	   from	   those	   who	   bought	   the	   same	   product	   but	   suffered	   no	   or	   small	   emotional	  
loss?58	  In	   litigation,	   the	   plaintiff	  would	  want	   to	   inflate	   the	   perceived	   emotional	   harm.	  
And	  when	  the	  underlying	   interest	   is	  a	  public	  good,	  third	  parties	  to	  the	   litigation	  might	  
offer	  side-­‐payments	  to	  fakers	  to	  encourage	  them	  to	  ask	  for	  restoration.	  
Even	   in	   individual	  suits,	  parties	  not	   inflicted	  with	  emotional	  distress	  may	  want	  
to	   mimic	   or	   exaggerate	   the	   claim	   of	   emotional	   harm	   because	   it	   would	   give	   them	  
additional	   grounds	   for	   recovery.	   True,	   fakers	   do	   not	   gain	   any	   benefit	   from	   the	  
restoration	   remedy.	  But	   they	   recognize,	   strategically,	   that	   the	   remedy	   is	   costly	   to	   the	  
defendant.	  The	  value	  of	  restoration	  damages	  to	  them	  accrues	  from	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
extract	  payments	  from	  the	  defendant	  in	  return	  for	  releasing	  her	  from	  the	  obligation	  to	  
fund	   such	   remedy.	   Such	   Coasian	   bargain	   would	   hopefully	   safeguard	   against	   wasteful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  See,	  e.g.,	  Block	  v.	  McDonald's	  Corp.,	  355	  Ill.	  App.	  3d	  1174,	  id.	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investment	   in	   restoration	   and	   thus	   solve	   any	   ex	   post	   inefficiency	   problem	   that	  many	  
courts	   seem	   to	   be	   troubled	   by,59	  but	   it	  would	   still	   be	   distortive	   to	   ex	   ante	   incentives	  
because	   compensation	   would	   be	   excessive.	   And	   like	   in	   the	   public	   goods	   case,	   fakers	  
might	  be	  paid	  by	  interested	  third	  parties	  (non-­‐victims)	  who	  benefit	  from	  restoration.	  To	  
be	   sure,	   these	   problems	   are	   moot	   if	   the	   restoration	   remedy	   is	   non-­‐waivable	   and	  
inalienable.	  We	  discuss	  this	  condition	  below	  in	  more	  detail.60	  	  
There	  are	  evidentiary	  ways	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  verification,	  but	  they	  may	  
be	  costly	  and	  require	  individualized	  inquiry	  into	  preferences	  and	  behavior,	  defeating	  the	  
utility	   of	   class	   actions.	   In	   aggregate	   suits,	   a	   court	   may	   recognize	   that	   some	   of	   the	  
plaintiffs	  are	  sincere	  about	  the	  emotional	  loss	  complaint,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  unmanageable	  
to	  sort	  plaintiffs	  one	  by	  one	  and	  accomplish	  adequate	  compensation.	  In	  individual	  suits,	  
courts	  might	  collect	  clues	  to	  adjudge	  the	  sincerity	  of	  emotional	  harm	  claims,61	  but	  this	  
would	  complicate	  the	  litigation.	  Ultimately,	  an	  evidence-­‐based	  verification	  mechanism	  is	  
impractical,	   explaining	   why	   current	   doctrine	   prefers	   to	   resolve	   the	   emotional	   harm	  
challenge	  by	  general	   categorization.	  We	  need	  an	  alternative	   to	   the	  evidence-­‐based	  or	  
the	  categories-­‐based	  mechanisms,	  and	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  section	  we	  propose	  one.	  
It	  is	  a	  screening,	  or	  sorting,	  mechanism	  that	  induces	  plaintiffs,	  each	  individually	  aware	  of	  
his	  or	  her	  intrinsic	  emotional	  harm,	  to	  self-­‐select.62	  
	  
2.	  The	  Sorting	  Mechanism	  
	  
Instead	  of	  evidence	  about	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  emotional	  harm,	  courts	  can	  use	  
incentives—a	   mechanism	   that	   harnesses	   the	   private	   information	   each	   plaintiff	   has	  
about	   his	   or	   her	   injury.	   To	   illustrate	   how	   an	   incentive-­‐compatible	  mechanism	  works,	  
consider	   a	   simplified	   setting	   in	  which	   there	   are	   only	   two	   types	   of	   plaintiff—“sincere”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  See	   e.g.,	   Peevyhouse	   v.	   Garland	   Coal	   &	   Mining	   Co.,	   382	   P.2d	   109,	   115	   (Okla.	   1963)	   (discussing	   the	  
economic	  waste	  concern	  of	  restoration	  damages).	  
60	  Infra	  note	  __	  and	  the	  accompanying	  text.	  
61	  See,	   e.g.,	   Betsy	   J.	   Grey,	   The	   Future	   of	   Emotional	   Harm,	   83	   FORDHAM	   L.	   REV.	   2605,	   2610-­‐2613	   (2015)	  
(arguing	  that	  in	  individual	  suits,	  courts	  are	  skeptical	  of	  emotional	  harm	  claims	  and	  pose	  high	  barriers	  for	  
the	  claimants).	  
62	  A	  self	  selection	  mechanism	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  developed	  in	  this	  article	  has	  been	  developed	  separately	  in	  
a	  formal	  working	  paper	  that	  addresses	  the	  problem	  of	  choice	  between	  damages	  and	  injunctions	  in	  private	  
harm	  cases	  in	  contracts.	  See	  Atkinson,	  supra	  note	  2.	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and	   “faker.”	   Later,	   we	   show	   how	   the	   mechanism	   works	   when	   plaintiffs	   may	   have	  
varying	  degrees	  of	  emotional	  injury.	  	  
	  
(i)	  Two	  Types	  
A	   plaintiff	   claims	   to	   have	   suffered	   emotional	   harm,	   but	   the	   court	   cannot	   tell	  
whether	  the	  claim	  is	  true.	  Assume	  that	  there	  are	  only	  two	  type	  of	  plaintiffs:	  Sincere	  and	  
Faker.	   The	   Sincere	   suffered	   high	   emotional	   harm	   that	   an	   accurately	   measured	  
restoration	  remedy	  would	  fully	  offset;	  the	  Faker	  suffered	  no	  emotional	  harm	  at	  all.	  
Like	  any	  sorting	  mechanism,	  the	  key	   is	  to	  offer	  all	  plaintiffs	  a	  menu	  of	  remedy	  
choices	  that	  “separates”	  them—where	  each	  type	  prefers	  a	  different	  item	  in	  the	  menu.	  
With	   two	   types,	   we	   only	   need	   two	   options.	   A	   Faker	   does	   not	   care	   about	   restoration	  
damages,	   and	  will	   choose	   a	   remedial	   option	   that	   contains	   the	  most	  money	   damages.	  
The	   Sincere,	   by	   contrast,	   desires	   both	   restoration	   and	   money	   damages,	   and	   might	  
choose	  a	  remedial	  option	  with	   less	  money	  but	  only	  restoration.	  With	  this	   in	  mind,	  the	  
two	  remedial	  options	  that	  need	  to	  offered	  are	  straight	  forward:	  	  
(1) Restoration:	  paid	  directly	  to	  repair	  in	  full	  the	  underlying	  interest	  of	  a	  Sincere	  
(2) Money:	  A	  “modest”	  unrestricted	  sum	  of	  cash	  paid	  to	  the	  plaintiff’s	  pocket	  
A	   Sincere	   type	   would	   choose	   option	   (1)	   because	   she	   values	   restoration	   and	  
because	   option	   (2)—with	   only	   a	   small	   sum	   of	   money	   in	   it—is	   not	   attractive	   enough	  
relative	   to	   the	   value	   of	   restoration.	   A	   Faker	  would	   choose	   option	   (2),	   no	  matter	   how	  
small	  the	  sum	  of	  money	  in	  it,	  because	  option	  (1)	  is	  worthless	  to	  her.	  In	  a	  sense,	  option	  
(2)	   is	  designed	  as	  “bait”—for	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  smoking	  out	  the	  non-­‐harmed	  fakers.	  
By	   choosing	   the	  money	   damages,	   a	   Faker	   reveals	   its	   bluff	   and	  would	   be	   counted	   out	  
from	  the	  restoration	  calculation.	  A	  Faker	  gets	  money	  for	  nothing—a	  modest	  amount	  of	  
pecuniary	  recovery	  despite	  suffering	  no	  emotional	  harm.	  This	  is	  a	  standard	  inefficiency	  
in	   any	   sorting	   equilibrium,	   a	   necessary	   evil	   to	   overcome	   the	   problem	   of	   incomplete	  
information.	  But	  as	  long	  as	  the	  money	  damages	  in	  option	  (2)	  are	  small,	  this	  distortion	  is	  
relatively	  benign.	  
Notice	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  inalienability	  condition.	  Once	  the	  remedial	  choice	  
is	  made,	   it	  must	   not	   be	   renegotiated	   between	   the	   parties	   or	   else	   a	   Faker	   too	  would	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choose	  the	  costlier	  restoration	  remedy	  (option	  (1)).	  If	  able	  to	  trade	  the	  remedy	  (with	  the	  
defendant	  or	  with	  a	  third	  party),	  a	  Faker	  would	  expect	  to	  extract	  a	  bounty	  greater	  than	  
the	  modest	   sum	   in	  option	   (2).	  As	  we	  discuss	   in	   Section	   III,	   the	   inalienability	   condition	  
poses	  quite	  a	  challenge.	  It	  must	  stop	  not	  only	  ex	  post	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  remedy,	  but	  
also	   various	   forms	   of	   ex	   ante	   agreements.	   For	   example,	   a	   third	   party	  who	   also	   cares	  
about	   the	   underlying	   interest	   and	   who	   expects	   to	   gain	   from	   restoration	   damages	  
imposed	   in	   this	   litigation	   might	   offer	   to	   pay	   Fakers	   to	   choose	   restoration.	   Or,	  
settlements	   might	   be	   negotiated	   before	   remedial	   choices	   are	   made	   (and	   prior	   to	  
litigation),	  and	  if	  Fakers	  have	  credible	  threats	  to	  choose	  the	  costlier	  restoration	  damages	  
of	   option	   (1)	   they	   may	   be	   able	   to	   extract	   a	   larger	   settlement	   and	   defeat	   the	  
inalienability	   condition.	   Like	   any	   sorting	   mechanism,	   renegotiation	   may	   lead	   to	   its	  
unraveling,	  and	  rendering	  it	  renegotiation-­‐proof	  is	  a	  critical	  institutional	  challenge.	  
	  
(ii)	  More	  Than	  Two	  Types	  
How	  would	  the	  sorting	  mechanism	  change	  when	  there	  are	  more	  than	  two	  types	  
of	  plaintiffs?	  Imagine	  that	  along	  with	  the	  Faker	  and	  the	  Sincere,	  there	  is	  now	  also	  a	  third	  
type	   of	   plaintiff—an	   “Intermediate”—who	   suffered	   some	   mild	   emotional	   harm.	   The	  
Intermediate	   type	   does	   care	   about	   the	   underlying	   interest	   and	   does	   benefit	   from	  
restoration,	   but	   less	   than	   the	   Sincere	   type.	  We	   consider	   this	   three-­‐type	   setting	   as	   a	  
capsule	   for	   understanding	   how	   the	   sorting	   mechanism	   would	   work	   in	   reality,	   where	  
plaintiffs	  likely	  vary	  along	  a	  continuum.	  
We	  show	  below	  that	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  to	  “separate”	  the	  different	  types—to	  offer	  
a	  menu	  of	  remedial	  options	  that	  induces	  each	  type	  to	  choose	  a	  different	  option.	  But	  we	  
also	  show	  that,	  aside	  from	  the	  enormous	  complexity	  of	  a	  sorting	  menu,	  it	  might	  also	  be	  
less	  efficient	  than	  a	  two-­‐option	  menu.	  Unlike	  the	  two-­‐type	  case,	  where	  the	  inefficiency	  
due	  to	  sorting	  amounts	  to	  a	  negligible	  bounty	  paid	  to	  the	  Faker,	  in	  the	  multi-­‐type	  setting	  
greater	  inefficiency	  would	  result.	  In	  particular,	  we	  show	  that	  sorting	  would	  require	  the	  
Faker	   bounty	   to	   be	   significantly	   higher	   and	   would	   inevitably	   involve	   significant	   over-­‐
compensation	  of	   some	   types	  of	  plaintiffs,	   resulting	   in	  over-­‐deterrence	   for	  defendants.	  
Because	  of	  these	  costs,	  full	  sorting	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  the	  right	  objective	  for	  a	  remedy	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scheme.	  It	  would	  be	  better,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  types	  of	  the	  cases	  we	  identify	  below,	  to	  set	  
up	   a	   remedial	   menu	   that	   leads	   to	   some	   partial	   “pooling”—namely,	   where	   different	  
types	   of	   plaintiffs	   end	   up	   choosing	   the	   same	   remedy.	   We	   use	   a	   brief	   numerical	  
illustration	  to	  draw	  out	  these	  general	  insights.	  
Consider	  the	  following	  scenario.	  The	  defendant	  caused	  harm	  to	  the	  environment	  
that	   costs	  $100	   to	   restore.	  The	  court	   can	  order	  any	  mix	  of	   restoration	   (R)	  and	  money	  
(M)	  damages	  to	  compensate	  the	  plaintiff.	  The	  plaintiff	  values	  the	  damages	  according	  to	  
the	  following	  simple	  formula:	  
V	  =	  M	  +	  aR	  
The	  term	  “a”	  distinguishes	  the	  different	  types	  of	  plaintiffs.	  A	  Faker	  is	  identified	  by	  a=0,	  
namely,	  she	  values	  only	  the	  money	  damages.	  For	  her,	  V	  =	  M.	  The	  Sincere	  is	  identified	  by	  
a=1,	  and	   for	  her	  any	  combination	  of	   restoration	  and	  money	  damages	   is	  valued	  as	  V	  =	  
M+R.	  In	  between,	  the	  Intermediate	  is	  distinguished	  by	  0<a<1.	  The	  court	  cannot	  observe	  
a,	  and	  thus	  cannot	  tell	  the	  plaintiff’s	  type.	  Notice	  that	  a	  simple	  remedy	  of	  R=$100	  would	  
perfectly	   redress	   each	   type	   of	   plaintiff’s	   true	   emotional	   loss,	   but	   would	   also	   be	  
prohibitively	  expensive,	  imposing	  costs	  on	  the	  defendant	  exceeding	  the	  harm	  caused.	  
	  To	  separate	   the	   three	   types,	   the	  court	  may	  present	  a	  menu	  of	   three	   remedial	  
options.	  As	  in	  the	  two-­‐type	  case,	  the	  menu	  should	  include	  a	  pure	  restoration	  damages	  
option	  that	  would	  be	  chosen	  by	  the	  Sincere,	  and	  perhaps	  a	  pure	  money	  damage	  option	  
to	   sort	   out	   the	   Faker.	   But	   in	   addition	   the	  menu	  would	   now	   have	   to	   include	   a	   hybrid	  
option	   for	   the	   Intermediate.	   To	  begin	   constructing	   such	  menu,	   consider	   the	   following	  
options:	  
(1) Restoration	  damages,	  No	  money:	  R	  =	  $100;	  M	  =	  0	  
(2) Hybrid	  damages:	  R	  =	  RH	  ;	  M	  =	  MH	  
(3) Money	  damages,	  No	  Restoration:	  R	  =	  0;	  M	  =	  MH	  +	  1	  
Option	  (1)	  is	  intended	  to	  provide	  full	  restoration	  to	  the	  Sincere.	  	  
Options	  (3)	  is	  intended	  to	  attract	  the	  Faker,	  as	  it	  provides	  the	  greatest	  money	  damages.	  	  
Option	   (2)	   is	   intended	   to	  attract	  only	   the	   Intermediate	   type.	  For	   that	   to	   succeed,	   two	  
“incentive	  constraints”	  must	  be	  met:	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(S*)	   MH	  +	  RH	  ≤	  100	  
(I*)	   MH	  +	  aRH	  ≥	  100a	  
Condition	  (S*)	  guarantees	  that	  the	  Sincere	  would	  prefer	  option	  (1)	  of	  full	  restoration	  to	  
the	  package	  of	   partial	   restoration	  and	  money	  offered	  under	  option	   (2).	   Condition	   (I*)	  
guarantees	  that	  the	  Intermediate	  would	  prefer	  option	  (2)	  to	  option	  (1).	  By	  construction,	  
we	  know	  that	  the	  Faker,	  but	  now	  one	  else,	  prefers	  option	  (3).	  
Assuming	   that	   the	   three	   types	   of	   plaintiffs	   are	   equally	   likely,	   the	   total	   cost	   of	  
compensation	  to	  the	  defendant	  under	  this	  sorting	  scheme	  would	  be	  proportional	  to:	  
Total	  Cost	  =	  100	  +	  (RH	  +	  MH)	  +	  (MH	  +	  1)	  
We	  know,	  from	  condition	  (I*),	  that	  RH	  ≥	  100	  –	  MH/a,	  and	  thus:	  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡   ≥   100  + (100−𝑀𝐻𝑎 +𝑀!)   + (𝑀! + 1)	  
which,	  after	  simplifying,	  can	  be	  written	  as:	  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡   ≥   201  + 2𝑎 − 1𝑎 𝑀!	  
Total	  cost	  of	  compensation	  depends	  on	  a,	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  emotional	  harm	  to	  
the	  Intermediate	  type.	  If	  a	  is	  high—here,	  if	  a	  ≥	  ½	  —	  the	  total	  cost	  is	  minimized	  by	  MH	  =	  
0,	  which	  (from	  the	  two	  incentive	  conditions)	  requires	  RH	  =	  100.	  In	  this	  case,	  option	  (2)—
the	  hybrid	  option—becomes	   identical	   to	   the	  option	   (1)	  of	   full	   restoration.	  The	  Sincere	  
and	  the	  Intermediate	  types	  would	  be	  pooled	  into	  the	  same	  selection.	  The	  intuition	  is	  the	  
following:	   the	  higher	  a,	   the	  greater	   the	  money	  component	   that	  needs	   to	  be	  added	   to	  
option	  (2)	  for	  any	  reduction	  of	  its	  restoration	  component.	  But	  any	  such	  increase	  in	  the	  
money	  payoff	   in	   option	   (2)	   has	   to	   be	  matched	  by	   an	   identical	   increase	   of	   the	  money	  
payoff	  in	  option	  (3)	  (since	  option	  (3)	  has	  to	  include	  as	  least	  as	  much	  money	  damages	  as	  
option	  (2).)	  For	  high	  enough	   levels	  of	  a,	   this	  added	  monetary	  cost	   is	   too	  burdensome,	  
and	   the	   defendant	   would	   prefer	   to	   compensate	   the	   Intermediate	   type	   with	   full	  
restoration	  and	  no	  money	  damages,	  namely,	  with	  option	  (1).63	  
The	  results	  flip	   if	  a	  ≤	  ½.	  Now	  the	  total	  cost	   is	  minimized	  by	  MH	  =	  100a,	  namely	  
the	  maximal	  level	  of	  MH	  that	  is	  consistent	  (from	  the	  two	  incentive	  conditions)	  with	  non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  The	  cutoff	  level	  a	  >	  ½	  is	  specific	  to	  this	  example,	  in	  which	  there	  are	  three	  types	  with	  equal	  likelihood.	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negative	  RH.	  With	  such	  high	  monetary	  component	   in	  option	  (2),	   this	  option	  would	  not	  
contain	   any	   restoration	   component,	   and	   thus	   RH	   =	   0.	   Here,	   the	   Intermediate	   and	   the	  
Faker	   types	   would	   be	   pooled	   into	   the	   same	   selection,	   which	   contains	   only	   a	   money	  
component.	  The	  intuition	  is	  the	  following:	  with	  low	  a,	  giving	  restoration	  damages	  to	  the	  
Intermediate	  achieves	  little	  saving	  in	  terms	  of	  reduce	  money	  damages	  in	  option	  (2),	  and	  
it	  is	  therefore	  more	  effective	  to	  load	  option	  (2)	  with	  cash.	  Yet	  because	  the	  Intermediate	  
can	  always	  select	  option	  (1)	  and	  enjoy	  a	  payoff	  of	  100a,	  the	  minimum	  cash	  necessary	  in	  
option	   (2)	   is	   100a.	   This	   would	   also	   be	   the	  money	   payment	   offered	   under	   option	   (3),	  
since	  both	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  contain	  no	  restoration.	  	  
To	  recap,	  while	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  offer	  a	  menu	  of	  remedies	  that	  leads	  to	  full	  sorting	  
of	  plaintiffs	  according	   to	   the	   intensity	  of	   the	  emotional	  harm	  suffered,	   such	  a	  scheme	  
would	  lead	  to	  over-­‐compensation.	  Those	  who	  have	  not	  been	  harmed	  would	  have	  to	  be	  
offered	   significant	  monetary	  bounties,	   and	   the	  more	   variation	   there	   is	   across	  plaintiff	  
types,	   the	   greater	   the	   over-­‐compensation	   problem.	   Such	   over-­‐compensation	   would	  
undermine	  the	  compensatory	  goal	  that	  rationalizes	  the	  restoration	  damage	  measure—
to	  each	  according	  to	  the	  true	  harm	  suffered.	  It	  would	  also	  create	  excessive	  deterrence.64	  
Instead,	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  level	  of	  compensation	  close	  to	  the	  actual	  harm	  suffered,	  
and	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  that	  the	  Sincere	  receives	  full	  restoration	  damages,	  a	  menu	  of	  
remedies	  must	  be	  offered	  so	  that	  some	  pooling	  occur.	  	  
Under	  the	  optimal	  sorting	  menu	  we	   identified,	  Sincere	  plaintiffs	  always	  receive	  
full	   restoration	   damages,	   and	   no	   money	   compensation.	   The	   primary	   goals	   of	   the	  
restoration	  damages	  regime—to	  correctly	  compensate	  those	  who	  suffered	  the	  alleged	  
emotional	  harm—is	  accomplished.	  In	  addition,	  under	  the	  optimal	  sorting	  menu,	  Fakers	  
always	  take	  some	  cash	  bounty	  and	  sort	  out,	  with	  no	  restoration	  ever	  ordered	  on	  their	  
behalf.	  The	  only	  complication	  arises	  with	  Intermediate	  types.	  Depending	  on	  the	  relative	  
intensity	  of	  their	  intermediate	  emotional	  harm,	  they	  will	  either	  pool	  with	  the	  Sincere	  or	  
with	  the	  Fakers.	  One	  way	  or	  another,	  such	  pooling	  creates	  over-­‐compensation—either	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  The	  deterrence	  concern	  could	  be	  overcome	  by	  reducing	  all	   remedies	  by	  the	  same	  multiple.	  However,	  
this	  would	  result	  in	  significant	  under-­‐compensation	  of	  some	  plaintiffs,	  in	  particular	  of	  the	  Sincere.	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too	  much	  restoration	  (if	  they	  pool	  with	  the	  Sincere)	  or	  too	  much	  money	  compensation	  
(if	  they	  pool	  with	  the	  Fakers).	  
	  
	  (iii)	  Non	  Linear	  Preferences	  
The	  discussion	  above	  assumed	  that	  victims	  valuation	  of	  restoration	  and	  money	  
damages	  exhibit	  constant	  substitution	  rate—namely,	  that	  for	  any	  type	  of	  victim,	  a	  dollar	  
of	  restoration	  is	  equivalent	  to	  a	  dollars	  of	  money,	  and	  the	  rate	  does	  not	  change	  across	  
level	   of	   restoration.	   If,	   for	   example,	  a	  =	  ½,	   the	  plaintiff	   value	  each	  additional	   $100	  of	  
restoration	  as	  $50	  of	  money.	  This	  linearity	  reflects	  an	  assumption	  that	  restoration	  of	  the	  
underlying	   interest	   has	   fixed	   marginal	   returns—that	   every	   additional	   increment	   of	  
restoration	  is	  equally	  valuable.	  But	  what	   if	  this	  assumption	  is	  wrong?	  What	   if	  plaintiffs	  
value	  the	  first	  dollars	  of	  restoration	  more	  than	  the	  last?	  In	  particular,	  if	  the	  first	  dollars	  
of	   restoration	   address	   the	  most	   critical	   harm	   to	   the	   underlying	   interest,	   it	   is	   possible	  
that	  each	  additional	  increment	  of	  restoration	  would	  have	  positive	  but	  diminishing	  value.	  
If	  plaintiffs	  have	  non-­‐linear	  preferences,	  the	  hybrid	  option	  of	  damages	  (“option	  
(2)”)	  becomes	  more	  desirable.	  Consider	  a	  case	   in	  which	   full	   restoration	  would	   require	  
restoration	  damages	  of	  $100.	  Assume,	  now,	  that	  some	  “intermediate”	  parties	  have	  non-­‐
linear	  preferences.	  Specifically,	   imagine	  an	   intermediate	  plaintiff	  with	  average	  a	  =	  0.6,	  
but	  with	  diminishing	  rate.	  For	  the	  first	  $50	  of	  restoration,	  this	  plaintiff	  has	  a	  =	  0.8;	  and	  
for	  the	  second	  $50	  increment	  of	  restoration	  the	  valuation	  falls	  to	  a	  =	  0.4.	  	  
When	  a	  was	  fixed	  at	  0.6,	  we	  showed	  that	  the	  lowest	  cost	  menu	  would	  have	  only	  
two	  options,	   full	   restoration	  of	  $100	  and	  money	  damages	  of	  $1,	  and	  the	   intermediate	  
type	  plaintiffs	  would	  pool	  with	   the	   sincere	  and	  choose	   the	   restoration	  damages.65	  But	  
now,	  a	   lower	  cost	   three-­‐option	  menu	   is	  available	   for	   the	  defendant.	  For	  example,	   the	  
defendant	  may	  offer	  the	  following	  three	  options:	  
(1) Full	  restoration	  of	  $100	  and	  no	  money	  damages;	  
(2) Restoration	  of	  $50	  and	  money	  damages	  $21;	  
(3) Money	  damages	  of	  $22	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Under	  the	  assumption	  that	  each	  type	  of	  plaintiff	  is	  equally	  likely,	  the	  total	  cost	  to	  the	  defendant	  of	  such	  
two-­‐option	  menu	  would	  be	  $100	  +	  $100	  +1	  =	  $201.	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A	  sincere	  plaintiff	  with	  a	  =	  1	  would	  choose	  option	  (1),	  whereas	  a	  faker	  with	  a	  =	  0	  
will	  choose	  option	  (3).	   If	  the	  intermediate	  plaintiffs	  had	  a	  fixed	  a	  =0.6,	  she	  would	  pool	  
with	   sincere	   and	   choose	   option	   (1).	   But	   with	   diminishing	   a,	   she	   is	   best	   off	   choosing	  
option	  (2),	  which	  gives	  her	  utility	  of	  0.8	  ×	  $50	  +	  $21	  =	  $61.	  This	  is	  more	  than	  she	  can	  get	  
under	  option	  (1),	  $60.	  And	  this	  three-­‐option	  menu	  reduces	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  defendant.66	  
Thus,	   with	   non-­‐linear	   preferences,	   the	   lowest	   cost	   damages	   scheme	   involves	  
finer	   separation	  of	   plaintiff	   types,	  with	   each	   type	   selecting	   a	   different	   combination	   in	  
the	   menu	   of	   restoration/money	   options.	   Because	   some	   plaintiffs	   value	   greatly	   only	  
partial	  restoration,	  such	  partial	  restoration	  remedial	  options,	  coupled	  with	  some	  money,	  
become	  part	  of	  the	  least-­‐cost	  restoration	  scheme.	  The	  analysis	  above	  demonstrates	  this	  
general	  proposition—that	  combinations	  of	  restoration	  and	  money	  have	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  




Is	  it	  realistic	  to	  expect	  courts	  to	  construct	  an	  election	  of	  remedy	  mechanism	  like	  
the	  one	  developed	  in	  this	  section?	  We	  saw	  that	  even	  with	  only	  two	  types	  of	  plaintiffs,	  
the	   design	   becomes	   quite	   complex,	   as	   courts	   have	   to	   determine	  what	   is	   the	   optimal	  
bounty	   for	   non-­‐sincere	   parties.	   In	   reality,	   parties	   vary	   along	   a	   continuum,	   further	  
complicating	   the	   challenge.	  And,	   adding	   to	   the	   complexity,	   their	  preferences	  over	   the	  
combinations	  of	  money	  and	  restoration	  may	  be	  non-­‐linear,	  which	   requires	  even	  more	  
information	  to	  design	  a	  scheme	  that	  would	  compensate	  plaintiffs	  at	  the	  least	  cost.	  	  
It	  is	  unrealistic	  to	  expect	  courts	  to	  have	  the	  necessary	  information,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  
unnecessary.	  To	  simplify	  the	  implementation,	  courts	  do	  not	  need	  to	  design	  the	  remedial	  
menu—it	  may	  be	  enough	  for	  courts	  to	  establish	  a	  single-­‐option	  restoration	  remedy	  and	  
let	   the	   defendant	   design,	   in	   its	   shadow,	   a	   more	   complete	   opt-­‐out	   menu.	   Under	   this	  
simplified	  scheme,	  the	  court	  could	  set	  one	  remedy	  for	  emotional	  harm—full	  restoration	  
damages	   and	   no	   money	   damages.	   The	   defendant	   could	   then	   offer	   as	   many	   opt	   out	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Under	  the	  assumption	  that	  each	  type	  of	  plaintiff	  is	  equally	  likely,	  now	  the	  total	  cost	  to	  the	  defendant	  of	  
the	  three-­‐option	  menu	  would	  be	  $100	  +	  $71	  +22	  =	  $193.	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combinations	   as	   it	  wishes.	   The	  defendant	  might	   offer	   only	   one	  other	   option—a	   small	  
money	  award	  that	  would	  pool	  the	  fakers	  and	  some	  intermediate	  types	  away	  from	  the	  
restoration	   remedy.	   Or,	   the	   defendant	   may	   have	   better	   information	   about	   the	  
distribution	   of	   the	   plaintiff’s	   preferences	   and	   thus	   offer	   different,	   or	  more	   than	   two,	  
remedial	   options.	   The	   advantage,	   of	   course,	   is	   to	   remove	   the	   burden	   of	   constructing	  
such	  menu	   from	   the	   court,	   and	   to	   place	   it	   on	   a	   party	   that	   has	   the	   right	   incentive	   to	  
design	  it	  optimally.	  	  
While	   the	   court	   may	   delegate	   to	   the	   defendant	   the	   design	   of	   the	   menu	   of	  
remedies,	   it	   should	  not	  delegate	   the	  determination	  what	   the	  underlying	   interests	  are,	  
and	   what	   forms	   of	   in-­‐kind	   restoration	   are	   adequate.	   The	   defendant	   would	   have	   an	  
incentive	   to	  offer	   restoration	  of	   irrelevant	   interests,	   so	  as	   to	  channel	  plaintiffs	   to	   take	  
the	   less	   costly	  money	   damage	   option	   in	   the	  menu.	  We	   discussed	   the	   possibility	   that	  
plaintiffs	  might	  differ	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  injured	  underlying	  interest	  (e.g.,	  people	  may	  
be	  vegetarians,	  or	  environmentalists,	  for	  different	  reasons.)	  In	  such	  scenarios,	  the	  court	  
should	   identify	   the	   several	   possible	   harmed	   interests	   and	   select	   the	   appropriate	  
restoration	   for	  each.	  We	   recognized	  above	   that	   such	  assessment	   tasks	  are	  not	   simple	  
and	   it	   is	   entirely	   possible	   that	   some	   emotional	   harms	   are	   so	   difficult	   to	   restore	   that	  
they’ll	   have	   to	   be	   overlooked.	   But	   so	   long	   as	   the	   court	   feels	   comfortable	   that	   a	  
particular	  restoration	  strategy	   is	  a	  plausible	  response	  to	  an	  alleged	  emotional	  harm,	   it	  
should	  establish	  it	  as	  the	  restoration	  damages	  option,	  and	  allow	  parties	  to	  sort	  in	  or	  out	  
of	   it.	   The	   critical	   simplification	   step	   is	   to	   leave	   the	   design	   of	   other	   remedial	   options,	  
which	   include	   less	   (or	   no)	   restoration	   and	   some	   quantum	   of	  money	   damages,	   to	   the	  
defendant.	  
	  
	   C.	  Non-­‐Waivers	  and	  Inalienability	  
	  
Restoration	   damages	   should	   not	   be	   subject	   to	   post-­‐judgment	   settlement	   in	  
which	   the	   plaintiff,	   in	   return	   for	   a	   side	   payment,	   waives	   her	   right	   to	   restoration	   and	  
releases	  the	  defendant	  from	  the	  obligation	  to	  restore.	  The	  reason	  should	  be	  obvious	  by	  
now:	  if	  plaintiffs	  are	  able	  to	  settle	  with	  the	  defendant	  after	  making	  their	  choice,	  many	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plaintiffs	  would	  prefer	  to	  choose	  full	  restoration,	  which	  is	  always	  the	  most	  burdensome	  
option	   for	   the	   defendant.	   Once	   this	   option	   is	   chosen,	   they	  would	   try	   to	   “extort”	   the	  
defendant	  and	  extract	  large	  settlements	  for	  waiving	  the	  awarded	  restoration	  remedy.	  	  
We	  think	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  such	  post-­‐judgment	  settlement	  and	  in-­‐
court	  opt	  outs,	  which	  our	  discussion	  above	  suggested	  would	  regularly	  occur	  under	  the	  
menu	   that	   defendants	   would	   offer	   (or	   courts	   would	   establish).	   When	   offered	   by	  
defendants,	  the	  waivers	  of	  restoration	  damages	  work	  best	  to	  address	  the	  actual	  loss	  to	  
the	   plaintiffs.	  When	   negotiated	   post-­‐judgment,	   the	   bargaining	   game	   changes	   and	   the	  
waivers	  of	  the	  adjudged	  restoration	  remedy	  would	  now	  provide	  recovery	  greater	  than	  
the	  loss.	  Plaintiffs	  with	  low	  emotional	   losses	  would	  be	  able	  to	  extract	  settlements	  that	  
come	   closer	   to	   the	   cost	   restoration	   imposes	   on	   the	   defendant,	   rather	   than	   the	  
emotional	  harm	  that	  they	  truly	  suffered.	  	  
But	   the	   risk	   of	   such	   post-­‐judgment	   extortion	   should	   not	   be	   exaggerated:	   it	  
mainly	  depends	  on	   information	  and	  bargaining	  power.	  A	  defendant	  who	  suspects	  that	  
the	  plaintiff	  derives	  low	  value	  from	  restoration	  would	  not	  easily	  be	  held	  up.	  In	  the	  same	  
way	  that	  the	  defendant	  could	  induce	  plaintiffs	  to	  opt	  out	  in	  court,	  it	  could	  induce	  such	  
opt	  out	  post-­‐judgment,	  by	  making	   take-­‐it-­‐or-­‐leave-­‐it	  offers	   from	  the	  same	  menu.	  Still,	  
the	   likelihood	  of	  renegotiation	  might	  encourage	  plaintiffs	  to	  choose	  from	  the	  menu	  of	  
options	  strategically,	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  getting	  more.	  	  
The	   right	   of	   restoration	   should	   also	   be	   inalienable—not	   transferrable	   to	   third	  
parties.	  When	   the	   underlying	   impaired	   interest	   is	   a	   public	   good,	   third	   parties	  may	  be	  
eager	   to	  have	  plaintiffs	   choose	   restoration	  damages	  over	  money	  damages,	   and	  might	  
pay	  them	  to	  do	  so.	  Such	  payments	  should	  be	  prohibited	  because	  they	  would	  raise	  the	  
level	  of	  damages	  beyond	  the	  harm	  caused	  to	  the	  legally	  recognized	  plaintiffs.	  	  
The	   non-­‐waiver	   and	   inalienability	   conditions	   could	   be	   easily	   enforced	   in	   class	  
actions.	  While	  post	   trial	   settlements	   could	  occur,	   it	  would	  be	  hard	   to	  hide	   them	   from	  
other	  litigants	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  public	  eye	  and	  the	  courts.	  Furthermore,	  even	  without	  
a	  straightforward	  prohibition	  on	  such	  settlements,	  defendants	  might	  find	  it	  in	  their	  best	  
interest	   to	   agree	  with	   the	   plaintiffs’	   attorneys	   not	   to	   renegotiate	   after	   trial,	   knowing	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that	   breaching	   such	   a	   promise	   could	   be	   costly.	   Unlike	   private	   actions,	   waivers	   or	  
transfers	  of	   the	   right	  of	   restoration	   in	  class	  actions	  would	  have	   to	  be	  done	  massively,	  
which	  would	  make	   them	  detectable.	   The	   court	   could	   simply	   prohibit	   such	   side	   deals,	  
and	  sanction	  violations	  by	  denial	  of	  recovery	  altogether.	  
III.	  The	  Social	  Value	  of	  Restoration	  Damages	  
	  
Part	   II	   argued	   that	   restoration	   damages	   is	   designed	   to	   address	   some	   of	   the	  
fundamental	   problems	   that	   Part	   I	   identified	   with	   current	   emotional	   harm	   doctrine.	  
Because	  emotional	  harm	   is	  hard	   to	   verify	   and	  measure,	   the	   restoration	   remedy	   could	  
address	   the	   victims’	  make-­‐whole	   interest	   while	   sidestepping	   these	   problems.	   And	   by	  
internalizing	   the	   cost	  of	   an	   important	   component	  of	   the	  overall	   harm,	   it	  might	  better	  
deter	  wrongdoers.	  If	  successful,	  the	  restoration	  remedy	  advances	  the	  two	  primary	  social	  
goals	   of	   remedies—compensation	   and	   deterrence	   of	   emotional	   harm—in	   a	   way	  
unmatched	  by	  any	  other	  existing	  private	  law	  remedy.	  In	  this	  part,	  we	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  
at	   these	   interests,	   and	   identify	   two	   additional	   social	   benefits	   that	   the	   restoration	  
remedy	  may	  create:	  saving	  administrative	  costs	  and	  benefitting	  third	  parties.	  
	  	  
A.	  Compensation	  
Restoration	  damages	  make	  victims	  who	  suffered	  emotional	  harm	  whole	   if	   the	  
court	  successfully	  identifies	  the	  underlying	  impaired	  interest	  and	  measures	  correctly	  the	  
degree	  of	  restoration	  that	  would	  exactly	  offset	  the	  harm.	  In	  the	  polluting	  car	  example,	  
this	  measurement	  is	  straightforward,	  carbon-­‐for-­‐carbon.	  In	  the	  vegetarian	  food	  case,	  it	  
is	  more	  challenging	  to	  identify	  the	  interest	  and	  to	  measure	  it,	  although	  errors	  of	  over-­‐	  
and	  under-­‐restoration	  could	  average	  out.	  	  
If	   the	  underlying	   interest	   is	   accurately	   identified	   and	  measured,	   no	  plaintiff	   is	  
left	  under-­‐compensated.	  Those	  with	  large	  emotional	  harm	  value	  the	  restoration	  greatly,	  
and	   those	   with	   weaker	   attachment	   to	   the	   underlying	   interest	   value	   the	   restoration	  
proportionally	  less.	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  concern	  with	  over-­‐compensation.	  We	  saw	  that	  
the	  key	  to	  solving	  the	  problem	  of	  verification	  is	  to	  separate	  the	  sincere	  from	  the	  fakers	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through	   some	   payment	   of	   money	   damages	   to	   fakers.	   Thus,	   some	   victims	   are	  
compensated	  in	  full	  (with	  restoration),	  while	  some	  non-­‐victims,	  or	  victims	  who	  suffered	  
small	  emotional	  harms,	  are	  over-­‐compensated	  (with	  money).	  	  
How	  does	  this	  over-­‐compensation	  problem	  compare	  to	  the	  conventional	  money	  
damages	  scheme?	   Ideally,	   if	  verification	  and	  measurement	  were	   feasible,	  a	   remedy	  of	  
money	   damages	   would	   be	   superior	   to	   restoration	   damages	   in	   compensating	   victims,	  
since	   it	  would	   result	   in	  neither	  under-­‐	  nor	  over-­‐compensation.	  But	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  
verification	   and	   measurement	   difficulties,	   a	   remedy	   of	   pure	   damages	   would	   under-­‐
compensate	  some	  victims	  and	  over-­‐compensate	  others.	  We	  thus	  cannot	  offer	  a	  general	  
proposition	   on	   the	   superiority	   of	   one	   scheme	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   another	   with	   respect	   to	  
compensation.	  If	  the	  over	  compensation	  problem	  under	  restoration	  damages	  is	  severe,	  
the	  scheme	  might	  perform	  poorly.67	  
Note,	   that	   the	   over-­‐compensation	   could	   be	   fully	   resolved	   by	   eliminating	   the	  
election	   of	   remedy	   mechanism	   and	   requiring	   all	   plaintiffs	   to	   accept	   restoration	  
damages.	   Here,	   no	   one	   is	   under-­‐	   or	   overcompensated	   (fakers	   receive	   restoration	  
damages	  that	  have	  no	  compensatory	  value	  to	  them),	  but	  the	  burden	  on	  the	  defendant	  
would	  be	  greater,	  creating	  over-­‐deterrence,	  as	  we	  explain	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
	  
B.	  Deterrence	  
Restoration	   damages	   can	   create	   over-­‐deterrence	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	  
restoration	  might	  be	  more	  expensive	  than	  the	  emotional	  harm	  it	  remedies.	  And	  second,	  
fakers	  have	  to	  be	  paid	  off	  despite	  suffering	  no	  harm.	  While	  both	  problems	  are	  possible,	  
we	  now	  try	  to	  argue	  that	  their	  scope	  is	  limited.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Still,	   it	  has	  the	  advantage	  over	  conventional	  damages	  of	  avoiding	  under-­‐compensation	  (as	   long	  as	  the	  
underlying	   interest	   is	   accurately	   identified	   and	   measured).	   Therefore,	   if	   the	   legal	   system	   fears	   under-­‐
compensation	  more	   than	  over-­‐compensation,	  our	   scheme	  would	  be	   superior	   to	   conventional	  damages.	  
Indeed,	  some	  commentators	  believe	  that	  as	  between	  faulty	  injurer	  and	  innocent	  victim,	  errors	  should	  be	  
allocated	  to	  the	  former.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Jules	  L.	  Coleman,	  Mental	  Abnormality,	  Personal	  Responsibility,	  and	  Tort	  
Liability,	  in	  MENTAL	  ILLNESS:	  LAW	  AND	  PUBLIC	  POLICY	  107,	  120–21	  (Baruch	  A.	  Brody	  &	  H.	  Tristram	  Engelhardt,	  Jr.	  
eds.,	  1980)	   (arguing	   that	   justice	  considerations	   favor	   the	  victim	  over	   the	  wrongdoer);	  Stephen	  R.	  Perry,	  
The	  Moral	  Foundations	  of	  Tort	  Law,	  77	  IOWA	  L.	  REV.	  449,	  468	  (1992)	  (quoting	  the	  previous	  argument).	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Specifically,	   to	   achieve	   optimal	   deterrence	   a	   defendant	   should	   bear	   the	   least	  
cost	  necessary	   to	  make	   the	  victim	  whole.	   Ideally,	   restoration	   should	  be	  awarded	  only	  
when	  its	  cost	  is	  less	  than	  the	  emotional	  harm	  it	  eliminates.	  Otherwise,	  if	  verification	  and	  
measurement	   of	   the	   emotional	   injury	   were	   perfect,	   money	   damages,	   rather	   than	  
restoration,	  would	   provide	   optimal	   deterrence.	   The	   restoration	   remedy	   is	   particularly	  
appealing	   in	   cases	   of	   high	   emotional	   harm,	   because	   it	   is	  more	   likely	   that	   the	   cost	   of	  
restoration	  would	  be	  less	  than	  the	  emotional	  harm	  it	  cures.	  	  
Restoration	   damages	   could	   create	   over-­‐deterrence	   even	  when	   it	   is	   the	   least-­‐
cost	  measure	  to	  reduce	  high	  emotional	  harm—when	  fakers	  are	  hard	  to	   identify	  and	  a	  
bounty	   needs	   to	   be	   offered	   to	   sort	   them	   out.	   In	   our	   stylized	   two-­‐type	   example,	   the	  
bounty	  is	  nominal	  and	  thus	  its	  deterrence	  distortion	  is	  negligible.	  But	  we	  also	  saw	  that	  
when	   plaintiff	   types	   vary,	   the	   bounty	   for	   separating	   the	   fakers	   could	   be	   substantial.	  
True,	  the	  over-­‐deterrence	  arising	  from	  this	   informational	  challenge	  could	  be	  corrected	  
by	  scaling	  down	  the	  restoration	  remedy	  for	  all	  plaintiffs,	  but	  this	  would	   in	  turn	  defeat	  
the	  compensation	  goal	  underlying	  the	  scheme.	  
Ultimately,	   we	   think	   the	   problem	   of	   over-­‐deterrence	   under	   the	   restoration	  
remedy	   is	  mitigated	   by	   several	   additional	   factors.	   First,	  when	   emotional	   harm	   is	   low,	  
plaintiffs	   are	   not	   motivated	   to	   sue,	   and	   when	   they	   are	   represented	   through	   a	   class	  
action	  they	  are	  not	  motivated	  to	  redeem	  their	  award.	  Such	  passivity	  might	  be	  an	  artifact	  
of	  the	  present	  regime	   in	  which	  the	  monetary	  recovery	  for	  emotional	  harm	  is	   low,	  and	  
participation	  rates	  might	  increase	  if	  the	  monetary	  bounties	  were	  higher.	  	  
Second,	  if	  over-­‐deterrence	  leads	  to	  costly	  precautions,	  contractual	  parties	  might	  
be	  motivated	   to	  explicitly	  bargain	  ex	  ante	  over	   the	  extent	  of	  emotional	  harm	   liability.	  
People	  with	  low	  emotional	  stakes	  in	  the	  activity	  might	  contractually	  waive	  their	  right	  to	  
recover	  restoration	  damages,	  for	  a	  discount.	  Like	  any	  remedy,	  the	  restoration	  measure	  
would	  be	  a	  default	  rule	  that	  can	  be	  disclaimed	  contractually.	  Even	  when	  its	  application	  
is	  limited	  to	  contracts	  that	  have	  a	  “personal”	  element,	  parties	  with	  low	  emotional	  stakes	  
could	  opt	  out.	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Third,	   if	   the	   emotional	   harm	   arises	   from	   intentional	   and	   malicious	   violation,	  
over-­‐compensation	  does	  not	  create	  over-­‐deterrence	  because	  the	  objective	  of	  remedies	  
is	   to	   completely	  deter	   such	   conduct.	   Indeed,	   compensation	   in	   such	  willful	  harm	  cases	  
usually	   exceeds	   actual	   harm,	   to	   satisfy	   this	   deterrence	   rationale.68	  The	   car	   emissions	  
example	   falls	   into	   the	  willful	   breach	   category,	   and	   over-­‐compensation	   is	   necessary	   to	  
deter	  such	  hard-­‐to-­‐detect	  violations.	  	  
	  
C.	  Administrative	  Costs	  
A	   distinct	   advantage	   of	   the	   restoration	   remedy,	   compared	   to	   conventional	  
money	  damages,	  is	  simplified	  administration.	  The	  restoration	  remedy	  requires	  the	  same	  
preliminary	  burden	  as	  the	  existing	  money	  damages	  remedy—of	  classifying	  the	  injury	  as	  
one	   justifying	   recovery	   for	   emotional	   harm.	   But	   it	   simplifies	   the	   measurement	   and	  
verification	  tasks.	  The	  main	  task	  for	  courts	  would	  be	  to	  determine	  what	  full	  restoration	  
entails—namely,	   what	   are	   the	   injured	   underlying	   interests	   and	   what	   forms	   and	  
magnitude	   of	   restoration	   would	   be	   adequate.	   This	   is	   not	   a	   trivial	   task,	   but	   plaintiffs	  
could	   help	   it	   by	   self-­‐reporting	   the	   interest	   allegedly	   impaired.	   Since	   plaintiffs	   value	  
restoration	  damages	  only	  if	  they	  truly	  value	  that	  interest,	  they	  would	  have	  no	  interest	  to	  
cheat.	  The	  court	  would	  still	  have	   to	  determine	  whether	   the	  alleged	   injury	   is	   real.	  But,	  
the	   court	   would	   not	   have	   to	   set	   the	   menu	   of	   remedial	   options	   since	   the	   defendant	  
would	  have	  the	  incentive	  to	  design	  it.	  	  
This	   procedure	   is	   less	   burdensome	   than	   the	   existing	   money	   award	   litigation.	  
Plaintiffs	  no	   longer	  have	   to	  prove	   their	  harm,	  and	  courts	  no	   longer	  have	   to	   figure	  out	  
how	   to	   translate	   emotional	   grievance	   into	   dollars.	   Under	   the	   present	   regime,	   courts	  
sometimes	  standardize	  compensation	  by	  awarding	  a	  uniform	  measure	  of	  damages	  to	  all	  
plaintiffs,	   based	   on	   their	   average	   harm	   (or	   making	   some	   crude	   personalization,	   by	  
categorizing	  plaintiffs	  into	  several	  groups).	  But	  even	  with	  standardization,	  administrative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  See,	  e.g.,	  Oren	  Bar-­‐Gill	  and	  Omri	  Ben-­‐Shahar,	  An	  Information	  Theory	  of	  Willful	  Breach,	  107	  Michigan	  L.	  
Rev.	   (2009);	   Richard	   Craswell,	   When	   is	   a	   Willful	   Breach	   'Willful'?:	   The	   Link	   Between	   Definitions	   and	  
Damages,	  107	  MICH.	  L.	  REV.	  1501	  (2009);	  George	  M.	  Cohen,	  The	  Fault	  Lines	  in	  Contract	  Damages,	  80	  VA.	  L.	  
REV.	  1225	  (1994).	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costs	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  high	  because	  it	  might	  be	  hard	  to	  calculate	  average	  harms.	  Surveys	  
of	  plaintiffs	  may	  create	  distorted	  accounts,	  and	  surveys	  among	  the	  general	  population	  
may	  not	  be	  representative.	  	  
Consider,	   for	   example,	   the	  burden	  of	   remedying	   emotional	   harm	  arising	   from	  
consumption	   of	   falsely	   labeled	   vegetarian	   food.	   Rather	   than	   establishing	   an	   arbitrary	  
money	  award	   (which	  would	  attract	  endless	   fake	  claimants,	   thus	   requiring	   some	  costly	  
verification),	   the	   court	   need	  only	   designate	   a	   restoration	   target	   that	   fits	   the	   reported	  
impaired	  interest,	  and	  the	  sum	  necessary	  to	  offset	  the	  wrong.	  The	  court	  would	  identify,	  
for	  example,	  an	  organization	  dedicated	  to	  vegetarian	  causes	  (perhaps	  one	  proposed	  by	  
the	  plaintiff)	  and	  the	  money	  necessary	  to	  offset	  the	  harm	  to	  animals	  committed	  by	  the	  
use	  of	  animal	  ingredients	  in	  the	  food.	  
	  
D.	  Third-­‐Party	  Effects	  
Restoration	   of	   an	   underlying	   interest	   shared	   by	   others	   creates	   a	   public	   good,	  
benefitting	  all	  those	  who	  value	  the	  interest.	  Restoring	  an	  environmental	  resource,	  or	  a	  
religious	  symbol,	  benefits	  all	  environmentalists	  or	  members	  of	  the	  religious	  sect.	  This	  is	  
an	   advantage	   that	   money	   damages	   do	   not	   have.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   an	   emotionally	  
harmed	  recipient	  of	  money	  damages	  would	  spend	  the	  award	  to	  restore	  an	  underlying	  
interest	   shared	   by	   others.	   But	   as	   long	   as	   some	   of	   the	  monetary	   awards	   are	   privately	  
consumed,	  they	  create	  no	  benefit	  to	  others.	  	  
This	   advantage	   highlights	   the	   great	   attractiveness	   of	   restoration	   damages	   in	  
cases	  involving	  harm	  to	  public	  goods.	  Our	  discussion	  earlier	  lumped	  together	  emotional	  
harms	   from	   injury	   to	   public	   and	   to	   private	   interests.	   We	   now	   see	   that	   the	   case	   for	  
restoration	  damages	  is	  stronger	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  cases.	  While	  restoration	  damages	  
could	   remedy	   private	   harms	   too	   (like	   a	   spoiled	   wedding	   celebration	   or	   a	   devastated	  
backyard),	  it	  is	  only	  in	  the	  case	  of	  public	  harms	  that	  the	  third	  party	  effect	  augments	  the	  
social	   value	   of	   the	   remedy.	   These	   third	   parties	   may	   not	   have	   legally	   protected	  
expectations,	  but	  they	  benefit	  nevertheless.	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The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effect	  on	  third	  parties	  depends	  on	  another	  aspect	  of	  the	  
harm	  to	  the	  underlying	  interest:	  whether	  it	  accumulates	  across	  victims.	  Some	  harms	  are	  
lumpy.	  A	  destruction	  of	  a	  religious	  symbol	  through	  tortious	  action,	  or	  an	  oil	  spill,	  affects	  
many	  parties,	   including	  those	  who	  cannot	  sue	  for	  practical	  or	   legal	  reasons.69	  Granting	  
restoration	   to	   the	   active	   plaintiffs	   affects	   non-­‐suing	   parties	   and	   might	   remedy	   their	  
losses	  entirely.	   In	  such	  cases,	   restoration	  might	  be	  the	  cheapest	   (and	  maybe	  the	  only)	  
way	   to	   compensate	  all	   victims,	   regardless	   of	   their	   participation	   in	   the	   lawsuit.	   It	   also	  
creates	   optimal	   deterrence,	   since	   the	   wrongdoer	   internalizes	   the	   entire	   social	   harm	  
caused	  by	  his	  wrongdoing.	  	  
In	   other	   cases,	   the	   harm	   is	   divisible	   and	   accumulates	   across	   victims.	   Selling	   a	  
polluting	  car	  model	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  environmental	  promises	  creates	  harms	  that	  add	  up	  as	  
more	  people	  purchase	  the	  model.	  Here,	  the	  only	  parties	  who	  are	  compensated	  are	  the	  
suing	   plaintiffs.	   Third	   parties	   who	   care	   about	   the	   environment	   are	   not	   recognized	   as	  
victims	   (or	   third	   party	   beneficiaries)	   and	   are	   thus	   not	   entitled	   to	   restoration.	  
Nevertheless,	   they	   benefit	   from	   the	   restoration	   remedy,	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   they	  
benefit	  from	  the	  non-­‐breached	  contracts	  of	  others.70	  	  
IV.	  Application	  
	  
Part	   II	   argued	   that	   Restoration	   Damages	   address	   the	   measurement	   and	  
verification	  problems	  of	  emotional	  harm,	  which,	  Part	  I	  showed,	  have	  significantly	  limited	  
the	   availability	   of	   emotional	   recovery.	   Part	   III	   than	   claimed	   that	   the	   expansion	   of	  
recovery	  made	  possible	  by	  Restoration	  Damages	   is	   desirable,	   and	   compiled	   the	   social	  
interests	  that	  would	  be	  served	  by	  it.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Liability	  might	  not	  be	  imposed	  for	  duty	  of	  care	  and	  proximate	  cause	  type	  of	  reasons.	  See	  Section	  29	  of	  
the	  RESTATEMENT	  (THIRD)	  OF	  TORTS:	  LIABILITY	  FOR	  PHYSICAL	  HARM	  adopted	  the	  term	  “scope	  of	  liability”	  to	  refer	  to	  
what	  is	  commonly	  known	  as	  “proximate	  cause.”	  See	  also	  RESTATEMENT	  (THIRD)	  OF	  TORTS:	  LIABILITY	  FOR	  PHYSICAL	  
HARM	  §7	  (dealing	  with	  the	  duty	  of	  care	  under	  negligence	  law).	  
70	  On	   a	   different	   perspective,	   in	   the	   Volkswagen	   case,	   Volkswagen	   committed	   a	   wrong	   toward	   non-­‐
contractual	  parties	  (since	  the	  actual	  emission	  was	  not	  only	  beyond	  what	  the	  warranties	  guaranteed,	  but	  
also	  beyond	  what	  the	  law	  allowed).	  Ideally,	  all	  victims,	  both	  contractual	  and	  non-­‐contractual,	  should	  get	  
compensated	  even	  if	  practically	  (and	  legally)	  this	  is	  impossible.	  Restoration	  compensates	  those	  victims	  as	  
well.	  Under	  this	  view,	  restoration	  should	  probably	  be	  mandatory,	  to	  offset	  the	  emotional	  harm	  suffered	  
by	  plaintiffs	  and	  non-­‐plaintiffs	  alike.	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Part	   IV	   now	   offers	   a	   demonstration.	   Returning	   to	   the	   case	   that	   inspired	   our	  
thinking	   about	   this	   topic—Volkswagen’s	   emissions	   breach—we	   show	   that	   the	   court	  
approached	   plaintiffs’	   emotional	   harm	   claims	   in	   a	   manner	   consistent	   with	   the	  
Restoration	  Damages	  regime,	  but	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  approach	  was	  flawed	  
and	  could,	  in	  the	  future,	  be	  greatly	  improved.	  
	  
A. The	  Breach	  	  
From	  2009	  to	  2015,	  Volkswagen	  sold	  in	  US	  nearly	  600,000	  vehicles	  branded	  as	  
“clean	   diesel”	   and	  marketed	   as	   environmentally	   friendly.	   In	   fact,	   these	   vehicles	  were	  
high-­‐emitters.	   The	   deception	  was	  made	   possible	   by	   an	   anti-­‐detection	   “defeat	   device”	  
built	   into	   the	   vehicles	   allowing	   the	   cars	   to	   pass	   regulatory	   emissions	   tests	  with	   flying	  
colors.	  Specifically,	  this	  device	  was	  programmed	  to	  produce	  low-­‐emission	  results	  when	  
it	  sensed	  the	  vehicle	  is	  in	  an	  emission	  testing	  facility.	  Elsewhere,	  when	  operating	  under	  
normal	   circumstances,	   the	   emissions	   were	   higher.	   Volkswagen	   was	   able	   to	   brandish	  
these	  “certified”	  low	  emissions	  to	  environmentally	  eager	  car	  buyers,	  hiding	  the	  fact	  that	  
these	  vehicles	  emit	  nitrogen	  oxides	  40	  times	  over	  the	  permitted	  limit.71	  	  
Ultimately,	  the	  fraud	  was	  detected	  and	  litigation	  ensued.	  The	  price	  of	  the	  cars,	  
new	  or	  used,	  dropped.	  Aggrieved	  car	  owners	   joined	  hundreds	  of	  class	  actions	  alleging	  
breach	   of	   contract	   and	   related	   causes	   of	   action,	   all	   eventually	   consolidated	   into	   a	  
single	  multidistrict	  litigation	  in	  a	  federal	  court	  in	  California.	  The	  litigation	  also	  considered	  
claims	  filed	  by	  federal	  and	  state	  government	  entities	  for	  violation	  of	  criminal	  and	  other	  
public	  laws.72	  
B. The	  Settlement	  
Guided	   by	   a	   resourceful	   judge,	   the	   parties	   quickly	   reached	   settlements.	   The	  
most	  important	  one	  applied	  to	  the	  most	  commonly	  sold	  2.0-­‐liter	  diesel	  engine	  vehicles	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  See	  Volkswagen	  Settlement,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  p.2.	  
72	  EPA	   sued	  under	   Sections	  204	  and	  205	  of	   the	  Clean	  Air	  Act,	   42	  U.S.C.	   §§	  7523	  and	  7524.	   The	  Federal	  
Trade	  Commission	  (“FTC”)	  sued	  under	  Section	  13(b)	  of	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  Act	  (“FTC	  Act”),	  15	  
U.S.C.	  §53(b),	  and	  alleges	  violations	  of	  Section	  5(a)	  of	  the	  FTC	  Act,	  15	  U.S.C.	  §	  45(a).	  Additionally,	  the	  State	  
of	   California,	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   People	   and	   CARB,	   has	   sued	   for	   violations	   of	   the	   Consumer	   Financial	  
Protection	  Act,	  12	  U.S.C.	  §	  5536,	  and	  various	  California	  state	  laws.	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(covering	  490,000	  class	  members).	  Under	  it,	  Volkswagen	  agreed	  to	  pay	  consumers	  up	  to	  
$10	  billion	  in	  money	  damages.73	  In	  addition,	  it	  agreed	  to	  invest	  $2	  billion	  over	  ten	  years	  
to	  promote	  the	  use	  of	  zero	  emissions	  vehicles	  and	  $2.9	  billion	  in	  an	  emissions	  mitigation	  
trust	  (specifically, to	  reduce	  the	  excess	  nitrogen	  oxides	  emissions).	  The	  court	  indicated	  
that	  “[t]hese	  efforts	  address	  the	  environmental	  damage	  caused	  by	  Eligible	  Vehicles.”74	  
Aside	   from	   these	   private	   law	   settlements,	   Volkswagen	   plea	   bargained	   with	   the	  
government	   and	   paid	   $2.8	   billion	   criminal	   fine	   and	   additional	   $1.5	   billion	   in	   civil	  
penalties.75	  	  
The	  settlement	  offered	  plaintiffs	   two	  options	  to	  recover	   for	   the	   lost	  pecuniary	  
value	   of	   the	   car:	   (1)	   “Buyback”	   –	   Volkswagen	   buys	   owner’s	   vehicle	   at	   its	   pre-­‐scandal	  
price,	  or	  (2)	  “Fix”	  –	  Volkswagen	  fixes	  the	  owners	  vehicle	  according	  to	  a	  plan	  approved	  by	  
the	  EPA.	  The	  “buyback”	  option,	  designed	  to	  allow	  people	  to	  terminate	  their	  relationship	  
with	  Volkswagen,	   fell	   short	  of	   covering	   the	   full	  pecuniary	   loss.	  Because	   the	  “buyback”	  
option	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  pre-­‐scandal	  retail	  value	  of	  cars	  in	  their	  actual	  used	  conditions,	  it	  
allowed	  Volkswagen	  to	  keep	  some	  of	  the	  fraudulently	  inflated	  value.76	  	  
Thus,	  more	  compensation	  was	  necessary	  in	  the	  settlement	  to	  make	  car	  owners	  
financially	  whole,	  and	  it	  was	  offered	  as	  an	  add-­‐on	  “restitution	  payment”.	  This	  additional	  
component	   entitled	   each	   owner	   to	   $5,100,	   or	   $3000	   plus	   20%	   of	   the	   vehicle	   value,	  
whichever	  greater.	  What	  exactly	  this	  recovery	  intended	  to	  measure	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear.	  
If	  its	  intent	  was	  to	  fix	  the	  shortfall	  in	  the	  “buyback”	  option,	  or	  to	  account	  for	  the	  hassle	  
of	  the	  “fix”	  option,	  the	  amount	  is	  excessive.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  court’s	  acknowledgment	  that	  
some	   damages	   needed	   to	   cover	   the	   frustration	   suffered	   by	   environmentally	   caring	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  This	   amount	   is	   based	  on	   the	  unrealistic	   assumptions	   that	   all	   consumers	  will	   prefer	   the	   remedy	  most	  
expensive	   for	   Volkswagen.	   See	   Volkswagen	   Settlement,	   supra	   note	   1,	   at	   19	   ("The	   Settlement	   requires	  
Volkswagen	  to	  establish	  a	  Funding	  Pool	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  $10.033	  billion	  …	  This	  amount	  presumes	  100%	  
Buyback	  of	  all	  purchased	  Eligible	  Vehicles	  and	  100%	  Lease	  Termination	  of	  all	  leased	  Eligible	  Vehicles").	  
74	  See	  Volkswagen	  Settlement,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  40.	  
75	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Volkswagen	  AG,	  No.	  16-­‐CR-­‐20394,	  12-­‐13	  (Dist.	  Ct.	  Mich.	  2017)	  (Volkswagen	  group	  
plea	  bargain	  with	  the	  United	  States	  government).	  
76	  To	  see	  why,	  imagine	  that	  the	  fraud	  raised	  the	  new	  or	  used	  price	  by	  25%	  relative	  to	  the	  post-­‐detection	  
level.	   Consider	   a	   car	   that	   would	   have	   cost	   $20,000	   new	   and	   $12,000	   used,	   but	   due	   to	   the	   fraud	   was	  
priced,	   pre-­‐detection,	   at	   $25,000	   new	   and	   $15,000	   used.	   Buyers	   of	   the	   new	   car	   overpaid	   $5000,	   but	  
under	  the	  buyback	  they	  would	  receive	  only	  $3000	  back	  (the	  car	  would	  be	  bought	  back	  at	  $15,000,	  which	  
is	  $3000	  over	   its	   current	  market	  price).	  Effectively,	  Volkswagen	  would	  not	  be	  compensating	  owners	   for	  
the	  fraudulently	  inflated	  price	  of	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  car	  already	  consumed.	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buyers,	   the	  restitution	  payment	   is	  probably	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  crude	  compensation	  
for	  the	  emotional	  harm	  alleged	  by	  the	  plaintiffs.	  	  
	  	  
C.	  The	  Law	  	  
Had	  the	  case	  proceeded	  to	  trial,	  a	  pecuniary	  damage	  measure	  for	  the	  lost	  value	  
of	  the	  cars	  would	  have	  been	  awarded,	  likely	  resembling	  the	  ones	  in	  the	  settlement.	  But	  
would	   the	   court	   have	   awarded	   compensation	   for	   emotional	   harm?	   How	   would	   such	  
emotional	  recovery	  be	  measured?	  The	  parties	  to	  the	  settlement	  certainly	  thought	  that	  
some	   emotional	   damages	   were	   in	   the	   cards,	   and	   their	   settlement	   reflected	   such	  
expectation.	   The	   “restitution	   payment”	   to	   the	   car	   owners,	  we	   just	   saw,	  went	   beyond	  
redress	   for	   pecuniary	   harm.	   And	   the	   hefty	   payment	   (almost	   $5	   billion)	   towards	  
emissions	  mitigation	  programs,	  which	  was	  entirely	  separate	  from	  the	  criminal	  fines	  paid	  
to	  the	  government,	  went	  directly	  to	  the	  environmental	  source	  of	  the	  emotional	  distress.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  court	  explicitly	  recognized	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  emotional	  harm	  when	  
it	  approved	  the	  settlement.	  The	  court	  referred	  to	  the	  FTC	  position	  that	  the	  settlement	  
should	  “fully	  compensate	  victims	  of	  Volkswagen’s	  unprecedented	  deception,”	  and	  that	  
compensation	   should	   cover	   “the	   value	   of	   the	   lost	   opportunity	   to	   drive	   an	  
environmentally-­‐friendly	   vehicle.” 77 	  The	   court	   recognized	   the	   dilemma,	   noting	   that	  
“recovery	  of	   [emotional]	  damages	   is	   less	  certain	  given	   that	   the	  direct	  harm	  caused	  by	  
the	  TDI	  engines’	  nonconformity	  was	  not	  to	  the	  vehicle	  owner—who	  obtained	  a	  vehicle	  
that	  performed	  as	  expected—but	  to	  the	  public	  at	  large.	  Something	  could	  be	  allowed	  on	  
account	  of	  the	  owner’s	   frustration	  and	   inconvenience,	  but	  recovery	  on	  this	  basis	  might	  
be	  only	  modest’.”78	  (emphasis	  added).	  
Indeed,	   the	   underlying	   rationale	   of	   both	   the	   “buyback”	   and	   the	   “fix”	   options	  
recognized	   that	   for	   many	   consumers,	   a	   low	   emission	   car	   is	   worth	   more	   than	   a	   high	  
emission	   car.	  Otherwise,	  why	   allow	   consumers	   to	  withdraw	   from	   a	   deal	   (buyback)	   or	  
require	   in-­‐kind	   repair	   (fix)?	  Why	   not	   award	   diminution-­‐in-­‐value	   damages	   exclusively?	  
Such	  remedies	  are	  valuable	  to	  owners	  only	  if	  they	  care	  also	  about	  emissions.	  Recall	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  See	  Volkswagen	  Settlement,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  28	  
78	  Id.	  at	  16.	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no	   federal	   or	   state	   authority	   has	   declared	   the	   diesel	   cars	   illegal	   to	   drive, 79 	  and	  
Volkswagen	  was	   already	   being	   separately	   punished	   for	   violating	   public	   environmental	  
laws.	   The	   private	   law	   settlement	   thus	   reflects	   an	   attempt	   to	   redress	   more	   than	   the	  
pecuniary	  loss.	  
An	  award	  of	   emotional	  damages	   in	   this	   case	  accurately	   reflects	   the	  prevailing	  
doctrine.	   Despite	   the	   general	   reluctance	   of	   contract	   law	   to	   award	   remedies	   for	  
emotional	  harm,	  this	  case	  likely	  fell	  within	  what	  courts	  regard	  as	  the	  “personal	  interest”	  
category	   of	   transactions.80	  The	   cars	  were	  marketed	   as	   low	   emitting	   not	   because	   such	  
attribute	   serves	   an	   economic-­‐commercial	   interest,	   but	   rather	   in	   appeal	   to	   buyers’	  
personal,	  non-­‐pecuniary,	  emotional	  satisfaction.	  As	  a	  principal	  advantage	  sold	  to	  buyers,	  
and	  having	  a	  substantial	  impact	  on	  the	  price	  of	  the	  vehicles,	  it	  would	  be	  odd	  to	  classify	  
the	  emissions	  assurance	  as	  “incidental”	  and	  not	  deserving	  of	  remedial	  protection.	  
More	  difficult	  is	  to	  speculate	  how	  large	  the	  emotional	  damages	  recovery	  would	  
have	   been,	   if	   ascertained	   by	   court.	   Existing	   doctrine	   is	   a	   black	   box	   in	   that	   regard,	  
because	  it	  is	  asked	  to	  do	  the	  impossible—to	  put	  a	  price	  tag	  on	  a	  loss	  that	  is	  defined	  as	  
non-­‐pecuniary	  and	  incommensurable.81	  As	  in	  the	  settlement,	  such	  recovery	  would	  likely	  
have	  been	  crude,	   invariant	  across	  plaintiffs.	  Sincere	  environmentalists	  and	   fakers	  alike	  
would	  have	   collected	   the	   same	  award,	   and	   the	  duration	  of	   each	  plaintiff’s	   use	  of	   the	  
vehicle	   would	   likely	   have	   not	   factored	   into	   the	   award	   (although	   it	   surely	   affects	   the	  
magnitude	  of	  the	  emotional	  harm).82	  
Unlike	  the	  settlement,	   it	   is	  hard	  to	   imagine	  that	  a	  court-­‐set	  award	  would	  have	  
tried	   to	   remedy	   the	  emotional	  harm	  by	   requiring	  Volkswagen	   to	  contribute	  billions	  of	  
dollars	   towards	   emissions	   reduction.	   This	   strategy,	   which	   directly	   restores	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  EPA	  has	  explicitly	  stated	  it	  will	  not	  confiscate	  Eligible	  Vehicles,	  and	  “[t]he	  44	  states	  participating	  in	  the	  
Attorneys	   General	   statement	   have	   also	   agreed	   to	   allow	   Class	   vehicles	   to	   stay	   on	   the	   road	   pending	  
participation	  in	  the	  Class	  Action	  Settlement”.	  See	  Volkswagen	  Settlement,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  40.	  
80	  Valentine,	  362	  N.W.2d	  628.	  See	  the	  text	  accompanying	  note	  25.	  
81	  Valentine,	  362	  N.W.2d	  628,	  at	  263;	  Kewin,	  295	  N.W.2d	  50,	  at	  416	  (stating	  that	  emotional	  distress	  is	  not	  
possible	   to	   evaluate).	   Zager	   v.	   Dimilia,	   138	  Misc.	   2d	   448,	   450	   (N.Y.	   Village	   Ct.,	   1988)	   (stating	   that	   the	  
emotional	  bond	  between	  a	  man	  and	  his	  pet	  is	  impossible	  to	  reduce	  to	  monetary	  terms).	  	  
82	  Ironically,	  the	  restitution	  payments	  depended	  on	  usage,	  but	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction:	  the	  more	  mileage	  




underlying	   interest,	   requires	   a	   different	   set	   of	   doctrinal	   tools,	   which	   the	   restoration	  
damages	   remedy	   would	   hopefully	   provide.	   We	   thus	   end	   this	   article	   by	   briefly	  
demonstrating	  how	  Restoration	  Damages	  could	  be	  used	  in	  the	  Volkswagen	  case.	  
	  
D. Restoration	  Damages	  
If	  car	  owners	  suffered	  emotional	  harm,	  it	  is	  because	  their	  interest	  in	  driving	  low	  
emitting	  vehicles	  was	  violated.	  The	  underlying	  interest	  that	  was	  injured	  by	  the	  breach	  of	  
contract	   is	   thus	  straightforward:	  clean	  air.	  The	   longer	  one	  owned,	  and	  the	  more	  miles	  
one	   drove	   the	   vehicle,	   the	   larger	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   promised	   and	   the	   actual	  
emissions	   it	   caused,	   and	   the	   graver	   the	   injury	   to	   the	   underlying	   interest.	   Thus,	   each	  
owner’s	  emotional	  harm	  is	  derived	  from	  a	  single	  personalized	  quantity,	  measured	  by	  the	  
excess	  emissions	  its	  car	  ownership	  caused	  relative	  to	  the	  promised	  level.	  
Not	  only	  is	  it	  easy	  to	  measure	  and	  quantify	  the	  injury	  to	  the	  underlying	  interest	  
of	   each	   individual	   plaintiff,	   it	   is	   also	   reliably	   easy	   to	   restore	   the	   underlying	   interest.	  
Volkswagen	   could	   be	   ordered	   to	   take	   actions	   that	   reduce	   emissions,	   to	   exactly	   offset	  
the	  injurious	  increase.	  For	  each	  unit	  of	  carbon	  that	  was	  emitted	  in	  excess	  of	  its	  promise	  
to	   its	   customers,	   Volkswagen	   should	   be	   required	   to	   accomplish	   a	   unit	   of	   reduced	  
carbon.	   How?	   The	   settlement	   identified	   two	   possible	   emission	   reduction	   strategies—
invest	   in	   zero-­‐emissions	   electric	   vehicle	   technology	   and	   establish	   an	   emissions	  
mitigation	   trust	   to	   reduce	   excess	   nitrogen	   oxides	   emissions.	   Other	   strategies	   are	  
available.	  For	  example,	  Volkswagen	  could	  be	  ordered	  to	  purchase	  emissions	  permits	  in	  
the	  amount	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  equal	  to	  the	  injurious	  increase	  attributed	  to	  its	  deception,	  
and	   not	   use	   them.	   Ultimately,	   under	   a	   restoration	   damages	   scheme	   the	   court	   could	  
establish	   the	   target	  amount	  of	  emissions	   reduction	  goal	   and	   let	  Volkswagen	  choose	  a	  
restoration	  strategy	  that	  meets	  this	  goal.	  This	  would	  elicit	  the	  least	  cost	  restoration.	  
	  Any	  plaintiff	  claiming	  to	  have	  suffered	  emotional	  damages	  due	  to	  the	  emissions	  
would	  see	  its	  underlying	  interest	  restored,	  because	  her	  ownership	  and	  driving	  of	  the	  car	  
would	  now	  accomplish	   the	  personal	  environmental	  goal	  promised	  under	   the	  contract.	  
Since	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  reduce	  emissions,	  it	  would	  now	  be	  fully	  satisfied.	  If	  all	  owners	  are	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sincere	  about	  their	  claim	  of	  emotional	  harm,	  all	  would	  join	  this	  restoration	  remedy,	  and	  
the	  sum	  total	  of	  restoration	  ordered	  would	  equal	  the	  sum	  total	  of	  the	  excess	  emissions	  
due	  to	  all	  the	  vehicles.	  	  
But	   not	   all	   owners	   are	   sincere.	   Thus,	   a	   key	   to	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  
restoration	   damages	   is	   to	   sort	   out	   the	   less	   sincere	   ones.	   The	   sorting	   mechanism	   we	  
proposed	   in	   Part	   III	  would	   entitle	   the	   defendant	   to	   offer	   opt-­‐out	  money	   damages,	   or	  
some	   combinations	   of	   partial	   restoration	   and	   money.	   These	   alternatives	   would	   be	  
cheaper	  for	  the	  defendant	  and	  more	  valuable	  to	  the	  fakers	  or	  the	  semi-­‐environmental	  
plaintiffs.	  
Should	   the	   restoration	   remedy	  be	  scaled	  down	   in	   light	  of	   the	  public	   remedies	  
sought	  and	  obtained	  by	  the	  EPA	  and	  state	  regulators?	  These	  fines	  increase	  deterrence,	  
but	   they	   do	   not	   accomplish	   the	   remedial	   goal	   of	   restoration	   damages	   because	   the	  
money	   is	  not	  earmarked	  to	  redress	  the	  underlying	  environmental	   interest.	   It	  might	  be	  
that	  some	  car	  owners’	  vexation	  and	  frustration	  would	  be	  soothed	  by	  the	  knowledge	  the	  
wrongdoer	  is	  being	  fined	  dearly.	  But	  this	  psychological-­‐retributive	  sentiment	  is	  not	  the	  
goal	   of	   restoration	   remedy,	   nor	   does	   it	   reduce	   the	   need	   to	   repair	   the	   underlying	  
interest.	  For	  many	  owners,	  even	  full	  restoration	  would	  not	  relieve	  the	  offense	  of	  being	  
cheated,	  and	  it	  is	  exactly	  this	  added	  sense	  of	  betrayal	  that	  the	  fine	  addresses.	  
Moreover,	  even	  from	  a	  deterrence	  perspective,	  the	  fine	  paid	  to	  the	  government	  
does	  not	   justify	   a	   reduction	  of	   the	  private	   law	   restoration	   remedy.	  Rivers	   of	   ink	  have	  
been	   spilled	   to	   justify	   larger	   damages	   for	   willful	   breach,	   and	   this	   is	   not	   the	   place	   to	  
reproduce	  the	  rationale.83	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  think	  of	  breach	  more	  willful	  than	  that	  committed	  
by	  Volkswagen,	  and	  the	  fines	  paid	  to	  the	  government	  may	  well	  fit	  the	  remedy	  multiplier	  
necessary	  to	  deter	  such	  willful	  transgressions.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  
We	   started	   this	   article	   with	   a	   puzzle:	   why	   do	   emotional	   harms	   receive	   such	  
meager	  protection	  in	  private	  law?	  We	  showed	  that	  courts	  adjudicating	  contract	  and	  tort	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  See	  supra	  note	  68.	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claims	  often	   recognize	   that	  plaintiffs	  have	   sincere	   claims	   for	  emotional	  harm,	  and	  yet	  
these	  courts	  award	  money	  damages	  for	  emotional	  injuries	  only	  in	  rare	  cases.	  A	  possible	  
reason,	  we	  speculated,	  is	  the	  misalignment	  between	  the	  remedies	  private	  law	  has	  in	  its	  
arsenal	   and	   the	   emotional	   injuries	   plaintiffs	   demonstrate.	   The	   absence	   of	   adequate	  
remedies	  stop	  courts	  short	  of	  assigning	  liability.	  
The	   article	   offered	   a	   novel	   solution	   to	   this	   misalignment—a	   new	   private	   law	  
remedy	  of	  restoration	  damages.	  It	  has	  a	  simple	  theoretical	  foundation	  and	  requires	  little	  
information	   to	   implement.	   Parties	   claiming	   emotional	   grievance	   have	   to	   identify	   the	  
underlying	   interest	  and	  the	  court	  has	   to	  certify	   that	   the	  transaction	   indeed	   implicated	  
such	  interest.	   It	   is	  then	  up	  to	  the	  wrongdoer	  to	  offer	  a	  method	  for	  restoration,	  and	  to	  
create	  an	  election	  of	  remedy	  menu	  to	  sort	  out	  sincere	  victims	  from	  fakers.	  	  
While	   many	   of	   cases	   that	   motivated	   our	   analysis	   involved	   emotional	   harm	  
arising	  from	  people’s	  interest	  in	  the	  integrity	  of	  public	  goods	  like	  the	  environment,	  the	  
restoration	  remedy	  we	  developed	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  more	  traditional	  settings	  with	  a	  
single	  wrongdoer	  inflicting	  private	  harm	  on	  a	  single	  victim.	  We	  showed,	  but	  did	  not	  fully	  
develop	   the	   idea,	   that	   some	   fundamental	   dilemmas	   in	   the	   design	   of	   private	   law	  
remedies	  boil	  down	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  protection	  for	  emotional	  interests.	  	  
For	   example,	   expectation	   damages	   in	   contract	   law	   vary	   greatly	   depending	   on	  
recognition	  of	  parties’	  personal-­‐emotional	   interests.	  Courts	  are	  awarding	  high	  cost-­‐of-­‐
completion	  damages	  when	  the	  unfinished	  service	  spoils	  an	  emotionally	  valued	  goal	  of	  
the	  plaintiff.	  Or,	  to	  take	  another	  example,	  specific	  performance	  and	  injunctions	  become	  
available	  when	  emotional	  interests—like	  the	  plaintiff’s	  attachment	  to	  a	  particular	  goal—
are	   centrally	   acknowledged.	  While	   the	   remedies	   sought	   in	   these	   cases	  do	  not	   involve	  
the	  restoration	  damages	  we	  developed,	  the	  goals	  of	  such	  remedies	  are	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  
the	  restoration	  measure.	  And,	  importantly,	  the	  sorting	  mechanism	  for	  screening	  sincere	  
claims	  would	  apply	  with	  equal	  merit	  in	  these	  cases.	  
Unlike	   physical	   or	   pecuniary	   harm,	   emotional	   harms	   are	   hard	   to	   prove	   and	  
verify,	   and	  we	   thus	   developed	   the	   election	   of	   remedy	  mechanism	   to	   sort	   the	   sincere	  
plaintiffs.	   This	   mechanism,	   however,	   may	   be	   extended	   to	   resolve	   other	   remedial	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problems	   that	   were	   not	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   article.	   Plaintiffs	   have	   private	   information	  
about	  harms	  to	  reputation,	  harms	  to	  future	  interests,	  and	  even	  their	  future	  lost	  income.	  
The	   law—through	   evidentiary	   as	  well	   as	   substantive	   private	   law	   remedial	   doctrines—
limits	  recovery	  for	  such	  speculative	  harms,	  despite	  recognizing	  that	  plaintiffs	  are	  often	  
left	   under-­‐compensated	   (and	   defendants	   under-­‐deterred).	   Variants	   of	   the	   restoration	  
remedy	  can	  be	  developed	  in	  future	  work	  to	  compensate	  for	  these	  neglected	  harms.	  
In	   an	   economy	   increasingly	   focused	   on	   goods	   and	   services	   that	   provide	  
emotional	   rather	   than	   physical	   benefits,	   sellers’	   promises	   to	   deliver	   emotionally	  
satisfying	   experience	   has	   to	   be	   backed	   up	   with	   a	   legal	   infrastructure	   supporting	   the	  
expectations	   they	   create.	   Public	   law	   and	   non-­‐legal	   enforcement	   norms	   have	   made	  
significant	   adjustments	   to	  protect	   the	  growing	  domain	  of	   emotional	   expectations.	   For	  
private	  law	  to	  do	  its	  share,	  new	  remedies	  specially	  designed	  to	  address	  emotional	  harms	  
are	   needed.	   The	   restoration	   damages	  measure	   developed	   in	   this	   article	   could	   fill	   this	  
timely	  role.	  	  
	  
